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"Of Winks and Nods" -
Webster's Uncertain Effect
on Current and Future
Abortion Legislation
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services'
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no other decision by the Supreme Court in its last term
received as much attention as the long-awaited ruling in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services. Webster concerned the constitutionality
of various provisions regulating abortion in Missouri. The Supreme
Court upheld the validity of each of the statutory provisions it ad-
dressed. Nevertheless, each was dealt with in a manner that did not
disturb any major aspect of abortion law as it has developed since Roe
v. Wade.2 The Webster decision does reflect the possibility of a change
in the near future concerning the standard to be used in evaluating the
validity of state abortion regulations.3 The opinion also reflects the
widely differing views of the justices concerning the Roe framework,
which measures the competing interests regarding abortion throughout
a pregnancy. The effect the decision may have on the manner in
which state legislatures will be allowed to regulate abortion in the
future is unclear.
Justice Blackmun's dissent described his view of the effect: "The
plurality opinion is filled with winks, and nods, and knowing glances to
those who would do away with Roe explicitly."5 The plurality probably
would not agree with Justice Blackmun's "winks and nods" analogy. It
acknowledged, however, that its holding does allow state legislatures to
adopt abortion regulations which would have been prohibited under
previous abortion law.6 A majority of the Court, therefore, agreed that
some movement has occurred to alter the nature of the power to
1. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See infra notes 157-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
issue.
4. See infra notes 94-137 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
issue.
5. 109 S. Ct. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 3058.
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previous abortion law.' A majority of the Court, therefore, agreed that
some movement has occurred to alter the nature of the power to
regulate abortion as it has been defined in previous post-Roe cases.
This Comment will analyze the implications and effects of the
Court's holding in Webster and evaluate current and future state
abortion regulation in light of the decision. Part I traces the legal
history of Webster and the statutory provisions that were the subject of
the case. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Webster and
outlines the potentially changing standard by which future abortion
regulations will be evaluated. Part III discusses current state abortion
regulations concerning the four areas involved in Webster and addresses
the possible future effect of Webster in these areas.
7
I. LEGAL HISTORY
A. Missouri's Battles with the Supreme Court
Over Roe v. Wade
Webster does not represent the first time Missouri law has been
called into question by Roe v. Wade. Missouri has consistently
challenged the parameters of the Supreme Court's recognition of the
right to an abortion. Three times previous to Webster, Missouri
Attorneys General sought to preserve abortion regulations considered
inconsistent with Roe. For the most 'part, they were unsuccessful.' In
6. Id. at 3058.
7. Both Justices Scalia and Blackmun note that Webster increases even
further the impact of abortion as a political issue. They suggest that the
decision invites state legislatures to regulate abortion while the Court retains
power under Roe to determine the constitutionality of these new regulations.
With its focus on current and possible future state legislation, this Note
recognizes that conclusion.
8. The first of these attempts involved statutes criminalizing the per-
formance of abortions except when the mother's life was in danger. In Danforth
v. Rodgers, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973), the Supreme Court declared these statutes to
be unconstitutional. In response to this decision, Missouri legislators in June,
1974, imposed regulations on abortions during every phase of pregnancy. 109
S. Ct. at 3047 n.1. These regulations were challenged in Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). In this case, the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional provisions requiring spousal consent and in the case of minors,
parental consent, for an abortion. See id. at 67-75.
In 1979, Missouri legislators tried again to restrict abortion practices by
enacting legislation which 1) required abortions after the twelfth week of
pregnancy to be performed in hospitals; 2) required a pathology report for each
abortion performed; 3) required the presence of two physicians when abortions
were performed after viability; and 4) required minors to secure parental
[Vol. 55
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the fourth attempt, as noted above, Missouri Attorney General William
Webster found a more sympathetic audience.
B. Missouri Abortion Act of 1986
In February of 1986, seven members of the Missouri General
Assembly introduced into the Missouri House of Representatives House
Bill No. 1596 (Act) known as "An Act ... relating to unborn children
and abortion . . . [and] to the use of public funds."9 The Act passed
both the House and Senate in April of 1986 by substantial majorities
and in June 1986 Governor John Ashcroft signed it into law.1 ° By its
own provision, the Act was to become effective in August of 1986.11
Of the twenty sections contained in the original Act, seven faced
challenges in the United States District Court. 2 Although all seven
were struck down by the district court and-on appeal-the Eighth
requirement. Id. at 481. However, the Court held that the other provisions
under scrutiny were constitutional. Id. at 494. The Court reasoned that the
requirements in Ashcroft "provided a judicial alternative" by allowing the young
woman to anonymously seek consent for an abortion from the juvenile court. Id.
at 492.
In comparison to Missouri, Pennsylvania has been before the Supreme
Court to defend statutory sections alleged to be contrary to Roe on three
occasions: Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438 (1977).
9. H.R. 1596, 83rd Gen. Ass., 2nd Sess. (1986).
10. The Bill first passed the Mssouri House of Representatives on April 3,
1986 by a vote of 124 to 27. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE STATE OF
MISSOURI, SECOND REGULAR SESSION JANUARY 8, 1986 TO MAY 15, 1986 AND
VETO SESSION SEPTEMBER 3, 1986 TO SEPTEMBER 9, 1986, at 882-83 (1986)
[hereinafter HOUSE JOURNAL]. The Senate passed an amended version of House
Bill 1596 on April 16, 1986 by a vote of 23 to 5. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF
THE STATE OF MSSOURI, SECOND REGULAR SESSION JANUARY 8, 1986 TO MAY
15,1986 AND VETO SESSION SEPTEMBER 3, 1986 TO SEPTEMBER 9, 1986, at 1161-
62 (1986). The House approved the amended Senate version on April 23 by a
vote of 119 to 36. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra, at 1477-78. Governor Ashcroft signed
the bill into law on June 26, 1986. Id. at 2229. The lopsided majorities that
approved the bill indicated the deep, bipartisan support abortion restrictions
have traditionally received from the Missouri General Assembly.
11. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 662 F. Supp. 407,411 (W.D. Mo.
1987) [hereinafter Reproductive Health Servs. 1].
12. See id. at 430.
1990]
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Circuit, only four of the provisions were appealed to the Supreme
Court. 3  These four included the following: 1) a "preamble" which
declared that the life of each human being begins at conception;' 4 2) a
prohibition on the use of public facilities for abortions and the participa-
tion by public employees in performing abortions;15 3) a prohibition on
the use of public funding for abortion counseling;' 6 and 4) a require-
ment that physicians conduct viability tests prior to performing
abortions.'
7
The "preamble" provided that "[t]he life of each human being begins
at conception" and "[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life,
health, and well-being.""8 It also stated that all state laws are to be
interpreted to provide unborn children with the same rights available
to other persons, subject to the federal constitution, decisions of the
Supreme Court, and contrary state provisions.
19
The restrictions concerning public funds, facilities, and employees
who perform abortions or counsel women to have abortions were
contained in three separate Missouri statutes.' All three statutes also
contained provisions not appealed to the Supreme Court despite lower
court findings that the provisions were unconstitutionally vague. These
include restrictions on the use of public funds to perform abortions
1
13. The three provisions invalidated by the lower courts but not appealed
to the Supreme Court included: 1) a requirement that all abortions performed
at or after the sixteenth week of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; 2) a
prohibition on the use of public employees and facilities for abortion counseling;
and 3) a requirement that each physician obtain a woman's "informed consent"
prior to the performance of an abortion. 109 S. Ct. at 3049. This latter
provision required both the physician and the woman to sign a form indicating
that the woman was informed as to the following: 1) whether or not she was
pregnant; 2) the "particular risks" associated with the abortion technique to be
used; and 3) alternatives to abortion. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.039 (1986).
14. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1986).
15. Id. §§ 188.210, 188.215.
16. Id. § 188.205.
17. Id. § 188.029.
18. Id. § 1.205.1.
19. Id. § 1.205.2.
20. Id. §§ 188.205, 188.210, 188.215.
21. Id § 188.205. The district court and court of appeals both found section
188.205 void for vagueness based on its use of the terms "encouraging" and
"counseling." See, e.g., Reproductive Health Servs. I, 662 F. Supp. at 426.
Missouri appealed this finding to the Supreme Court. The focus of the public
funding provision was limited to those persons responsible for expending public
funds according to the Missouri Attorney General. This interpretation rendered
moot the question before the Court concerning the constitutionality of section
188.205. 109 S. Ct. at 3053.
[Vol. 55
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and restrictions on the use of public employees and public facilities to
counsel women concerning abortion.
22
For purposes of the Act, the Missouri General Assembly defined a
"public employee" as "any person employed by this state or any agency
or political subdivision thereof."'  A "public facility" was defined, as
"any public institution, public facility, public equipment or any physical
asset owned, leased or controlled by [the] state, or any agency or
political subdivision thereof."'  The Act defined a "public fund" as "any
fundi] received or controlled by this state or any agency or political
subdivision thereof, including, but not limited to, funds derived from
federal, state or local taxes, gifts or grants from any source, public or
private, federal grants or payments,, or intergovernmental transfers."25
The provision requiring viability testing by a physician applied only
when the physician had reason to believe the woman was at or beyond
the twentieth week of pregnancy.'
Reproductive Health Services of St. Louis and Planned Parenthood
of Kansas City, two non-profit corporations that assisted in the
performance of abortions, filed a class action suit challenging the Act in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.'
After filing the action in July, 1986, the class representatives sought a
temporary injunction to restrain enforcement of the challenged sections
of the Act. 28 The district court granted the request.' In December,
1986, the district court heard a full trial on the merits."
The district court interpreted the preamble as an attempt by the
state to make an end run around the Supreme Court's admonition in
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc." that a
"State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its
22. Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.210, 188.215 (1986). The district court and court
of appeals also found both of these statutes void for vagueness. See, e.g.,
Reproductive Health Serv. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1077-79 (8th Cir. 1988)
[hereinafter Reproductive Health Serv. I]. The Missouri Attorney General did
not appeal the Eighth Circuit's ruling on these provisions. 109 S. Ct at 3049.
23. Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.200(1) (1986).
24. Id. § 188.200(2).
25. Id. § 188.200(3).
26. Id. § 188.029.
27. Reproductive Health Servs. I, 662 F. Supp. at 410. The two non-profit
corporations were joined in the class action by three physicians, one nurse, and
one social worker. All were "public employees" at "public facilities" in Missouri.




31. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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regulation of abortion."3 2 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed and
noted that the preamble was part of a bill almost exclusively devoted to
abortion. From this the court of appeals drew the inference that "the
state intended its abortion regulations to be understood against the
backdrop of its theory of life."3' The appellate court also rejected the
state's reasoning that because the preamble is subject to Supreme Court
decisions, it is not directed at abortion and is, therefore, constitutional.
As the court explained, such a declaration cannot "validate state laws




The Eighth Circuit reiterated the district courts reasoning as it
related to the provision requiring viability tests "by physicians. The
court stated that "the Supreme Court has squarely addressed this point
and declared that 'neither the legislature nor the courts may proclaim
one of the elements entering into the ascertainment of viability-be it
weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor."'35 Since
the determination of viability is to be made as a "matter of medical skill
and judgment" the court concluded that the provision represented "an
impermissible legislative intrusion."3
'
The Eighth Circuit also agreed with the district court that the
statutory provisions prohibiting the use of public funds, facilities, or
employees to "encourage and counsel" a woman to have an abortion
were void for vagueness and a violation of the right to privacy.
Concerning the vagueness contention, the state argued that the two
words "encourage" and "counsel" encompassed and named only
"affirmative advocacy." The court rejected this interpretation noting
that the word "counsel" is "fraught with ambiguity; its range is
incapable of objective measurement. 3 7
On the question of right to privacy, the court found "that the ban
on using public funds, employees, and facilities to encourage or counsel
a woman to have an abortion is an unacceptable infringement of the
woman's fourteenth amendment right to choose an abortion."'  The
court of appeals relied upon its decision in Nyberg v. City of Virginia"'
to address the issue of public facilities. It found that this ban created
an undue burden on the free exercise of the right to choose abortion.
32. See, e.g., Reproductive Health Serus. I, 662 F. Supp. at 413.
33. Reproductive Health Serv. I, 851 F.2d at 1076.
34. Id. at 1077.
35. Id. at 1074 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388.89 (1979)).
36. Reproductive Health Serv. II, 851 F.2d at 1074 (quoting Reproductive
Health Servs. I, 662 F. Supp. at 423).
37. Reproductive Health Serv. II, 851 F.2d at 1078.
38. Id. at 1079.
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This burden is even more nettlesome, noted the court, when "it bars
women seeking to obtain and pay for abortions access to public facilities
when the evidence demonstrates that no public funds are expended by
allowing the abortion."40  Concerning the restrictions covering public
employees, the court of appeals reasoned that this provision of -the
statute placed "obstacles in the path of the woman's exercise of her
freedom of choice."4 It further reasoned that these obstacles would be
unable to stand absent a compelling state interest. Since the State was
unable to provide such an interest, the court ruled that the statute
violated the due process clause as interpreted in Roe.
42
II. ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COUR'S
DECISION IN WEBSTER
The Supreme Court's ruling in Webster reversed the decisions of the
district court and the court of appeals on the four portions of the
Missouri abortion statute that were before the court. In doing so, five
opinions were filed by the Court. The plurality opinion, written by
Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices White and Kennedy, Upheld
both the preamble and the ban on use of public facilities and employees
as not being facially unconstitutional. The plurality found the viability
testing provision of the Missouri statute constitutional, but also found
that the provision conflicted with the trimester framework of Roe v.
Wade. They used this conflict as a basis to modify Roe by abandoning
the trimester framework, but the remaining holdings of Roe were left
intact. The counseling provision in section 188.205 was found moot by
a unanimous decision of the Court.
Justice O'Connor concurred with the results reached by the
plurality on the four portions of the statute before the Court. She
disagreed with the plurality, however, that Webster afforded an
40. Reproductive Health Serv. II, 851 F.2d at 1082.
41. Id. at 1083 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980)).
42. Id. at 1083. The district court concluded that the restrictions on public
funds and assistance by public employees was a violation of the eighth
amendment since such provisions effectively denied women inmates access to
"medically necessary" abortions. Reproductive Health Servs. I, 662 F. Supp. at
428-29. The court of appeals disagreed with this contention. Reproductive
Health Serv. I, 851 F.2d at 1084. It found that the word "assisting" in the
statute, which makes it unlawful to expend public money, did not prevent "state
employees from arranging for abortion procedures for inmates or from
transporting and escorting inmates to abortion facilities." 1d. Because the
Supreme Court has "made clear that neither the due process clause nor the
equal protection clause requires public funding for abortions," the court of
appeals found the first sentence of section 188.205 to be constitutional. Id.
1990]
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opportunity to reconsider the Roe framework and she found that the
viability testing provision could be upheld as consistent with the
framework. Justice Scalia also concurred with the results reached by
the plurality on the four issues before the Court. He wrote separately
to express. his belief that Roe should have been fully addressed and
reversed. Two dissenting opinions, one written by Justice Stevens and
the other by Justice Blackmun with whom Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined, found the remaining three provisions of the Missouri
statute unconstitutional.
Each of the opinions gave separate treatment to the four provisions
of the Missouri statute and for the purposes of this analysis each of the
provisions will be treated separately.
A. The Four Provisions of the Missouri Act
1. The Preamble
The plurality criticized the meaning the court of appeals attributed
to the statement in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc.43 that "a State may not adopt one theory of when life
begins to justify its regulation of abortions." 4 The plurality found this
statement to mean only that an abortion regulation otherwise invalid
under Roe v. Wade cannot be justified because it embodies the State's
theory of when life begins.45 They asserted that this meaning has no
application to the preamble since the language of the preamble does not
expressly regulate abortion. The plurality reasoned that the preamble
may be read as the State simply exercising its authority to make the
kind of value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion found
permissible under the Court's decision in Maher v. Roe46
Because they viewed the preamble as a permissible "value
judgment" of the State, the plurality found passing on the constitution-
ality of the preamble unnecessary. The plurality delayed this determi-
nation until the Missouri courts decide the extent to which the preamble
will be used to interpret state statutes and regulations or to restrict
43. 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
44. Id. at 444.
45. 109 S. Ct. at 3050.
46. Id- The right of a state to express such a "value judgment" was
enunciated in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), which found that "Roe did not
declare an unqualified 'constitutional right to abortion.' . . . It implies no
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring,
childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of
public funds." Id. at 473-74.
[Vol. 55
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abortions in a specific way.47 They reasoned that passing on the
constitutionality is unnecessary at this time as they do not have the
power "to decide ... abstract propositions or to declare, for the
government of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.
4 8
In his dissent, Justice Stevens found the preamble unconstitutional
as interfering with both contraceptive choices and the Establishment
Clause of the first amendment. Justice Stevens addressed this first
claim by pointing out that the Missouri abortion statute defines
conception as "the fertilization of the ovum of a female with the sperm
of a male. " 49 According to Justice Stevens, this implies regulation of
post-fertilization forms of contraception such as the IUD and "morning
after pill" which prevent pregnancy by preventing a fertilized egg fzom
implanting on the wall of the uterus.' Justice Stevens found this
implication unconstitutional under the right of privacy in contraceptive
47. 109 S. Ct. at 3050. Several efforts have been made in Missouri to apply
the preamble to existing law in numerous contexts. The first involved
calculating a person's age from the time of conception, thus adding nine months
to age as it is traditionally measured. Columbia Daily Tribune, July 25, 1989,
at 10, col. 2. The Director of the Missouri Department of Revenue concluded
that the word "age" in state law means the time since birth. Id Therefore, the
moment of conception does not give rise to tax deductions in Missouri nor does
one become eligible for a driver's license at 15 years and 3 months. Id. The
attorney of an imprisoned woman used the preamble to bring suit against the
state on behalf of her fetus. Columbia Daily Tribune, Aug. 3, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
She alleged that the constitutional rights of the fetus were violated because it
was being imprisoned without having been charged with a crime, allowed an
attorney, or convicted or sentenced. Id A St. Louis County Judge, citing the
preamble, accepted a necessity defense and acquitted 21 people accused of
trespassing during sit-ins at an abortion clinic. Columbia Daily Tribune, Aug.
17, 1989, at 1, col. 2. A Boone County Judge held that the preamble does not
add nine months to a person's age and so does not provide a defense to the
charge of possession of alcohol by a minor. Columbia Daily Tribune, Aug. 19,
1989, at 1, col. 1. Further clarification of the impact of the preamble will be
provided when the Attorney General responds to the request of a member of the
Missouri General Assembly for an opinion of its affect on a wide range of state
laws. Columbia Daily Tribune, Sept. 2, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
48. 109 S. Ct. at 3050 (quoting Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179
U.S. 405 (1900)).
49. Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.015(3) (1986).
50. 109S. Ct. at 3080-81. Justice Stevens also points out that the definition
of conception under the Missouri statute conflicts with that of standard medical
texts which define conception as the implantation of the ovum in the uterus.
This occurs about six days after fertilization. See, e.g., D. MISHELL & V.
DAVAJAN, INFERTILITY, CONTRACEPrION & REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY 109-
110 (2d ed. 1986).
19901
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choices"l enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut52 and other cases
involving freedom of personal choice in the area of marriage and family
life. 3 He conceded that religious beliefs in the sanctity of human life
from the moment of conception provide a theological basis for making
a distinction between contraceptives which act immediately before
fertilization and those which act immediately after such time. He
found, however, that the absence of any identifiable secular basis for
this distinction renders the preamble invalid.5
Justice Stevens also used his conclusion that the preamble serves
no identifiable secular purpose in asserting that the preamble violates
the Establishment Clause of the first amendment. He viewed the
"findings" of the preamble as endorsing the theological position that
preserving the life of the fetus during the first forty or eighty days of
pregnancy involves the same secular interest which exists after viability
or after the fetus has become a "person" for purposes of protection under
the Constitution.55 Justice Stevens asserted that, during the period
immediately before and after fertilization, the Constitution allows a
woman to use contraceptives to prevent the fertilized ovum from
developing.5 He placed, as a matter of law, the burden on Missouri
to identify secular rights which distinguish the first days of pregnancy
from the period immediately before and after fertilization in order to
sustain the position endorsed by the preamble.5 7 Justice Stevens
concluded that no valid secular purpose exists which justifies making
such a distinction; therefore the preamble's endorsement of a theological
position is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.
In asserting that no such secular interest exists, Justice Stevens
withdrew a number of areas from consideration as secular interests of
the State. No interest exists in protecting the newly fertilized egg from
51. 109 S. Ct. at 3082. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agrees
with Justice Stevens that Griswold and its progeny may protect the use of post-
fertilization contraceptive devices. Id at 3059. However, she points out that
the appellees did not seek to enjoin such potential violations of Griswold, and
there is no indication that the preamble will be applied in this way. Under such
circumstances, she finds that the plurality is correct in finding an unconstitu-
tional application too hypothetical to invalidate the preamble on this basis. Id.
at 3059.
52. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 394 (1923); see
also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner V. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
54. 109 S. Ct. at 3082.
55. Id. at 3083.
56. Id. at 3083-84.
57. Id. at 3084.
[Vol. 55
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physical harm, he argued, because the capacity for suffering has not yet
developed.' According to Justice Stevens, the potential societal
interests in increasing population or the balancing of fiscal costs and
benefits are nonexistent because currently such considerations come
down on the side of permitting abortions. 59 Although the State was
admitted to have a valid interest in protecting a woman from an
incorrect abortion decision, the interest was not deemed to justify the
findings of the preamble. Additionally, Justice Stevens was unpersuad-
ed by the State's argument that the preamble is merely an amendment
to its tort, property, and criminal laws. He supported this conclusion by
contending that none of these areas of Missouri law were based or
supported by a definition of when life begins. He also pointed out that
such an argument is inconsistent with the prohibition, under the
Missouri Constitution, against statutes which pertain to more than one
subject matter.6°
Justice Stevens bolstered his conclusion that the preamble violates
the first amendment by pointing to the deeply held religious convictions
of many of the participants involved in the abortion debate. These
beliefs cannot find their way into abortion regulation, he asserted,
because under the Establishment Clause, "[t]he Missouri Legislature
may not inject its endorsement of a particular religious tradition into
this debate."61
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice
Stevens that the preamble unconstitutionally burdens the use of post-
fertilization contraceptives such as the IUD and "morning after" pill.
Additionally, he asserted the preamble may be invalidated because of
its statement that the rights of the unborn are "subject only to the
Constitution of the United States, and decisional interpretations thereof
by the United States Supreme Court."6 2 Justice Blackmun found that
this creates an interest in fetal life defined only by the limits of the
Supreme Courts holdings in the abortion area. He stated that such an
interest of indeterminable limits has the danger of "the unconstitutional
effect of chilling the exercise of a woman's right to terminate a
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Article 3, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution provides:
No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly
expressed in its title, except bills enacted under the third exception in
section 37 of this article and general appropriation bills, which may
embrace the various subjects and accounts for which moneys are
appropriated.
MO. CONST., art. III, § 23.
61. 109 S. Ct. at 3085.
62. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1986).
1990]
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pregnancy and of burdening the freedom of health professionals to
provide abortion services."
' a
2. Use of Public Employees or Facilities
The plurality, joined by Justices O'Connor and Scalia, upheld the
prohibition in the Missouri statute on the use of public employees or
facilities as consistent with the Supreme Court's earlier public funding
decisions in Maher v. Roe,' Poelker v. Doe,' and Harris v. McRae.'
The plurality also felt the ban reflects the general proposition that an
affirmative right to governmental assistance is not protected by the due
process clause even when the aid is needed to secure due process
interests,'which themselves cannot be deprived by the government.
67
Maher was an early case involving public funding of abortions.
The court in Maher upheld a Connecticut welfare regulation providing
Medicaid benefits for childbirth expenses but not for nontherapeutic
abortions. The Court approved cutting off Medicaid benefits for
abortions even though it "may make it difficult-and in some cases,
perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions" without public
funding.68 In Poelker, a companion case to Maher, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a directive issued by the mayor of St.
Louis prohibiting the performance of nontherapeutic abortions in city
funded hospitals. The Court reached this decision even though city
hospitals provided financed medical services for childbirth. Harris v.
McRae involved a failed constitutional challenge to the Hyde Amend-
ment, a law which severely restricted the use of federal funds to
reimburse the cost of nontherapeutic abortions under Medicaid.
The plurality rejected the court of appeals' reasoning that these
cases could be distinguished because the Missouri statute "does more
than demonstrate a political choice in favor or childbirth; it clearly
narrows and in some cases forecloses the availability of abortion to
women."69 The plurality found that, similar to McRae, the statute is
valid because it is not a "government obstacle" to obtaining an abortion
and does not leave a pregnant woman with any fewer choices than if the
State chose not to operate any public hospitals.7 0 The plurality
63. 109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.1.
64. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
65. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
66. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
67. 109 S. Ct. at 3051; see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1989).
68. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
69. Reproductive Health Serv. II, 851 F.2d at 1081.
70. 109 S. Ct. at 3052; see McRae, 448 U.S. at 315-17.
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admitted that the statute restricts a woman's ability to obtain an
abortion to the extent she chooses to use a physician affiliated with a
pubic hospital. They characterized this restriction, however, as being
considerably less burdensome and easier to remedy than the case in
Maher. Additionally, the plurality upheld the statute on the basis of the
statement in Maher that a state may implement a value judgment
favoring childbirth by refusing to fund abortions. They found that this
allows the state to implement that same value judgment by the way in
which it allocates other public resources such as hospitals and medical
staff.
71
The Eighth Circuit distinguished the Missouri statute from Maher
and its progeny on the basis that public facilities in Missouri recoup the
expenses of providing abortions with payments from the patients. To
the appellate court this indicated the Missouri statute created a
governmental obstacle to the right to receive an abortion rather than
merely expressing a preference for childbirth.72  The plurality dis-
agreed with this analysis and found no obstacle is created since,
"[n]othing in the Constitution requires States to enter or remain in the
business of performing abortions. Nor, as appellees suggest, do private
physicians and their patients have some kind of constitutional right of
access to public facilities for the performance of abortions."73  The
opinion also questioned how the -Missouri statute burdens a woman s
abortion decision at all if the State recoups all of its expenses in
performing abortions when no state subsidy is available. 74
The plurality concluded that Maher, Poelker, and McRae support its
view that a state may prohibit its resources from being used in
abortions even when the state recoups all of its expenses. They point
out that the ban upheld in Poelker applied to all women regardless of
their ability to pay. The plurality also pointed to the Court's emphasis
in Poelker that the decision to prohibit abortions in city hospitals was
"subject to public debate and approval or disapproval at the polls" and
that "the Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to
democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal childbirth
as St. Louis has done."' 5 The plurality seemed to indicate that the
71. 109 S. Ct. at 3052.
72. Reproductive Health Serv. II, 851 F.2d at 1083.
73. 109 S. Ct. at 3052.
74. Id. The plurality opinion does indicate, however, this conclusion might
change if a state had socialized medicine in which all of the hospitals and
physicians in the state were publicly funded or if the State attempted to bar
physicians who performed abortions in private institutions from using public
facilities for any purpose. Id. at 3052 n.8
75. Poelker, 432 U.S. at 521.
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decision to devote public resources of any kind to the performance of
abortions is a political issue.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
plurality's holding but she found that the broad definition given to
"public facilities" in the statute may permit some unconstitutional
applications of the ban. She implied that Maher, Poelker, and McRae
do not have unlimited application to the Missouri statute. She found
that these decisions "stand for the proposition that some quite straight-
forward applications of the Missouri ban on the use of public facilities
for performing abortions would be constitutional. '"M The appellees
suggested that attempting to impose the ban on abortions on private
hospitals that are connected to public water and sewage lines is one
potential misapplication of the definition of a public facility.77 Justice
O'Connor viewed these potential unconstitutional applications insuffi-
cient to invalidate the statute, however, because the appellees brought
only a facial challenge to the statute. A facial challenge may be
defeated if any set of circumstances exist under which the statute would
be valid.78
Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun's dissent found the
statute's definition of a "public facility" troublesome. He did not,
however, hesitate to declare the statute invalid on this basis. He found
that through a definition of "public facility," which prohibits abortions
in institutions that in all pertinent respects are private, Missouri has
gone beyond just withdrawing from the business of abortion. He
asserted the statute is an affirmative step, in violation of Roe's
command, toward restricting abortions by private physicians in private
hospitals.79 Justice Blackmun distinguished the "sweeping scope" of
the provision as going far beyond the rights of a state established in
76. 109 S. Ct. at 3059 (emphasis added). The type of application of the
broad definition of a "public facility" which Justice O'Connor may find
unconstitutional is suggested in the appellees' brief. It states therein that this
definition could include private hospitals which are linked to public water and
sewage lines or which lease state land or equipment. Brief for Appellees at 49-
50, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) [hereinafter
Brief for Appellees].
77. Brief for Appellees, supra note 76, at 49-50.
78. 109 S. Ct. at 3060.
79. Id at 3068 n.1. Justice Blackmun uses Truman Medical Center in
Kansas City, Missouri as an example of this type of application of the statute.
In 1985, 97% of all Missouri abortions at sixteen weeks or later were performed
at Truman Medical Center. Justice Blackmun points out that the hospital is
located on ground leased from a political subdivision of the state. Therefore, he
claims that the statute may be applied to prohibit abortions at this facility even
though the hospital is staffed primarily by private doctors and administered by
a private corporation. Id.
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Maher, Poelker, and Harris to offer incentives in favor of childbirth and
disassociate state-owned institutions and personnel from abortion
services. Contrary to the plurality opinion, Justice Blackmun felt the
statute leaves a woman with fewer choices-and in some cases no
choice-than she would have if the State chose not to operate any public
hospitals at all. He stated that by the manner in which public facility
has been defined, "Missouri has brought to bear the full force of its
economic power and control over essential facilities to discourage its
citizens from exercising their constitutional rights."8°
3. The Counseling Provision
Although all three of the counseling provisions of the Act were
struck down by the lower courts, Missouri only brought section 188.205,
which deals with funding, to the Supreme Court.8' The State asserted
in its brief to the court that this provision is directed solely at the
persons responsible for expending public funds and does not apply to
public or private physicians or health care providers.8 2 The appellees'
brief stated that they are not adversely affected under such an
interpretation; therefore, a controversy no longer exists concerning this
provision.w The plurality opinion, speaking for the unanimous Court
on this issue, found that this rendered the controversy over section
188.205 moot. It directed the court of appeals to vacate the judgment
of the district court with instructions to dismiss the relevant part of the
complaint.'
80. Id
81. The appeal of the other two provisions of the statute would have
undoubtedly brought complex first amendment issues before the Court as well
as the question of whether the provisions unconstitutionally restricted abortion.
82. Brief for Appellants at 43, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109
S. Ct. 3040 (1989) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants].
83. Brief for Appellees, supra note 76, at 31-32.
84. 109 S. Ct. at 3054. The plurality ends its discussion on this issue with
a quote from Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 200 (1988), which states,
"Because this [dispute] was rendered moot in part by [appellees] willingness
permanently to withdraw their equitable claims from their federal action, a
dismissal with prejudice is indicated." 109 S. Ct. at 3054. Both Justice
O'Connor and Justice Blackmun, however, note the interpretation of section
188.205 given by the State in its brief is not binding upon the Missouri Supreme
Court and the provision might be relitigated should that court adopt a different
interpretation. Id. at 3061, 3069 n.1.
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4. Viability Testing
The viability testing provision in section 188.029 of the Missouri
statute elicited the most commentary from the Justices and provided the
plurality with an opportunity to challenge the Roe trimester framework.
The testing provision consists of two sentences which provide:
Before a physician performs an abortion on a woman he has
reason to believe is carrying an unborn child of twenty or more
weeks gestational age, the physician shall first determine if the
unborn child is viable by using and exercising that degree of
care, skill, and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinary
skillful, careful, and prudent physician engaged in similar
practice under the same or similar conditions. In making this
determination of viability, the physician shall perform or cause
to be performed such medical examinations and tests as are
necessary to make a finding of the gestational age, weight, and
lung maturity of the unborn child and shall enter such findings
and determination of viability in the medical record of the
mother.85 -
a. Interpretation of Section 188.029
The debate over the interpretation of the viability testing provision
centered on the interplay between the provision's two sentences. The
court of appeals interpreted the second sentence of the statute as
requiring that after twenty weeks the physician must perform tests to
determine gestational age, fetal weight, and lung maturity regardless
of the costs, health risks, and usefulness of performing those tests in a
particular situation.8
Although the usual practice of the Court is to defer to the lower
court's construction of a state statute, the plurality rejected the court of
appeal's interpretation as "plain error.,8 7 The plurality found that the
court of appeals erred by not reading the second sentence in the context
of the provision as a whole. The opinion stated that the lower court's
interpretation violated both canons of Missouri statutory interpretation,
and the general principle that statutes should be interpreted to avoid
constitutional difficulties.8 Under the lower court's interpretation,
the second sentence of section 188.029 requires the physician to perform
the indicated tests regardless of whether, in the physician's medical
85. Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.029 (1986).
86. Reproductive Health Serv. II, 851 F.2d at 1074.
87. 109 S. Ct. at 3054.
88. Id. at 3054-55.
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judgment, the tests would be helpful in determining viability or would
pose significant risks to the mother and the fetus. The first sentence,
however, requires the physician to exercise reasonable professional skill
and judgment. The apparent conflict between these two sentences led
the plurality to conclude that the lower court misinterpreted the
statute. Additionally, the plurality found that such an interpretation is
incongruous with the use of the word "necessary" in the statute and the
statute's expressed purpose of determining viability.89 Under the
plurality's interpretation of the statute, then, the viability testing
provision does not require the physician in all cases to perform tests to
determine gestational age, weight, and lung maturity of the unborn
child. The plurality interpreted the testing provision to require a
physician to perform tests only when the tests will be useful in making
subsidiary findings about viability. 0
Justice Stevens' dissent stated that the Court's practice of accepting
the interpretation of the lower court even when a different interpreta-
tion is justified forecloses adoption of the plurality's interpretation.9'
He also asserted that the interpretation adopted by the court of appeals
is the "plain meaning" of the statute which cannot be ignored even if the
plurality's interpretation avoids constitutional difficulties.92  He
89. Id. at 3055.
90. Id. at 3054-55. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion agrees with the
plurality's interpretation of section 188.029. She adds, however, that in addition
to only requiring tests useful in making subsidiary findings as to viability, the
statute requires only tests which would be prudent to perform in the particular
medical situation before the physician. Id. at 3061.
As a practical matter, the provision may have little effect on the per-
formance of viability tests by physicians. The parties in Webster agree that prior
to thirty weeks of pregnancy, the only possible finding relevant to determining
viability is that of gestational age. They also agree that the standard medical
procedure for ascertaining gestational age is ultrasonography, a process using
sound waves to create a visual image. Sophisticated ultrasound equipment is
needed to make the three-dimensional measurements required to estimate fetal
weight. The only known test to determine fetal lung maturity is amniocentesis.
This involves the insertion of a hollow needle into the uterus to extract amniotic
fluid which is then analyzed for the presence of certain chemicals. This test
yields no useful information about viability before thirty weeks of pregnancy.
Brief for Appellees, supra note 76, at 26-27; Brief for Appellants, supra note 82,
at 32.
91. 109 S. Ct. at 3079-80.
92. Id. at 3080. Justice Blackmun and the other dissenters agree with
Justice Stevens' interpretation that the second sentence of section 188.029
requires the physician to perform tests to determine gestational age, weight, and
lung maturity regardless of whether these tests are necessary to make a
viability determination, add to the cost of the abortion, or pose substantial
medical risks to the woman and the fetus. Under such a construction, both
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supported his conclusion by adding that the word "shall" is used twice
in the second sentence of the statute without any qualifying language.
He also pointed out that under the plurality's interpretation the second
sentence adds nothing to the first sentence's requirement that a
physician use his best skill and judgment. Contrary to the plurality's
opinion, Justice Stevens asserted that it is not incongruous to assume
the Missouri Legislature was trying to protect nonviable fetuses by
making an abortion more expensive. He claimed the preamble and the
statute as a whole indicate that the purpose of the Missouri abortion
statute is "to protect the potential life of the fetus, rather than to
safeguard maternal health.0
3
b. Conflict With the Roe Framework
After setting out its interpretation of section 188.029, the plurality
maintained that the statute conflicts with the Court's decisions in
Colautti v. Franklin9 4 and City of Akron. The plurality did not find the
testing provision unconstitutional because of this conflict. Rather, it
used the conflict as a basis for abandoning the trimester framework
established in Roe v. Wade. The Roe framework sought to balance the
interests of a state in safeguarding maternal health and protecting
potential human life95 against a woman's constitutional privacy rights
which were found to encompass the decision concerning whether to
terminate her pregnancy.' The framework places no restrictions on
dissents find that the statute is unconstitutional regardless of the Roe
framework. They find that even under the rational basis test the statute's
requirement of tests which have no medical justification impose additional
health risks upon the woman and the fetus. Therefore, they conclude that such
tests bear no rational relation to the State's interest in the protection of fetal
life. Id. at 3070. Justice Blackmun also agrees with the finding of the court of
appeals that section 188.029 conflicts with the decision in Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379, 388-89 (1979), that a state may not proclaim one of the elements
entering into the determination of viability. 109 S. Ct. at 3070 n.4.
93. Id at 3080 (quoting Reproductive Health Serus. I, 662 F. Supp. at 420).
94. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
95. "[A] State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At
some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently
compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision.
The privacy right, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute." Roe, 410 U.S. at
154.
96. "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as
we feel it is, or .. .in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
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abortions performed in the first trimester of pregnancy.9 7 The state's
interest in maternal health becomes compelling at the second trimester
of pregnancy. At this point, the state may regulate abortion to the
extent the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and
protection of maternal health.98 The framework sets viability as the
point at which the state's interest in potential human life becomes
compelling. With a compelling interest, the state may "regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion except when it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.'" 9
Two findings of the plurality provide the basis for the conflict
between the viability testing provision of the Missouri statute and the
Court's decisions in Colautti and City of Akron. First, the plurality
stated that the testing statute is concerned not with maternal health,
but with promoting the State's interest in potential human life."°°
Second, the statute is said to create a presumption that a viable fetus
exists at twenty weeks. The presumption must be rebutted with tests
before an abortion may be performed.' 0 '
In Colautti, the Court emphasized the importance of the viability
determination in the Roe framework and the role of the physician in
making this determination. The Court stated, "[t]he determination of
whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the
judgment of the responsible attending physician."0 2 The plurality
asserted that Missouri's viability testing provision conflicts with this
holding because it inflicts state regulation upon the medical determina-
tion of viability. Further, added the plurality, both the district court
and court of appeals struck down the testing provision on this basis.
103
The provision in City of Akron that is relevant to this issue required
second trimester abortions to be performed in hospitals. The Court
struck down the regulation because it burdened access to obtaining an
abortion by doubling the cost. 04 Because the testing provision of the
Missouri Act, in some cases, increases the cost of second trimester
terminate her pregnancy." Id at 153.
97. Id. at 163.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 165.
100. 109 S. Ct. at 3055.
101. Id.
102. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 396 (quoting PlannedParenthood of Central Mo.
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 53, 64 (1976)).
103. 109 S. Ct. at 3056.
104. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 434-35.
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abortions, the plurality felt it conflicts with the holding in City of
Akron.1
0 5
The plurality believed the inconsistency between the Missouri
statute and the holdings in Colautti and City of Akron indicates the
inadequacy of the trimester framework and has resulted in the
complication of abortion law. The opinion stated that "the rigid
trimester analysis of the course of a pregnancy enunciated in Roe has
resulted in subsequent cases like Colautti and Akron making constitu-
tional law in this area a virtual Procrustean bed."'
Justice Blackmun's dissent emphasized that the plurality adopted
an incorrect interpretation of section 188.029. He suggested, however,
that even under the plurality's interpretation, the statute does not
conflict with the decisions in either Colautti0 7 or City of Akron.' 8
More significantly, Justice Blackmun emphasized that, even though
some second trimester abortions in which the fetus is not viable will be
affected, the plurality's interpretation does not conflict with Roe. He
stated, "Nothing in Roe, or any of its progeny, holds that a State may
not effectuate its compelling interest in the potential life of a viable
fetus by seeking to ensure that no viable fetus is mistakenly aborted
because of th6 inherent lack of precision in estimates of gestational
age."1°9 The additional costs added to second trimester abortions by
the testing provision were justified as being " merely incidental to, and
a necessary accommodation of, the State's unquestioned right to prohibit
nontherapeutic abortions after the point of viability." 0 Thus, Justice
105. 109 S. Ct. at 3056.
106. Id.
107. Justice Blackmun reads the plurality's interpretation of section 188.029
as only instructing a physician to use tests to make the findings listed in the
statute when such tests are medically feasible and appropriate. As such, he
finds the provision does not conflict with Colautti since the determination of
viability is still within the medical judgment of the physician. Id. at 3071 n.6.
108. Justice Blackmun concludes the application and justification of the
viability testing provision sufficiently separates it from the regulation in City of
Akron for it to be upheld under the holding in that case. He finds the testing
provision of section 188.029, which would apply only to some second trimester
abortions, is significantly different from the hospitalization regulation in City of
Akron since that provision purported to regulate all second trimester abortions.
Justice Blackmun also emphasizes the holding statement in City of Akron that
the State may not impose "a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access
to a relatively inexpensive, and otherwise accessible, and safe abortion
procedure." Id. Justice Blackmun believes, unlike the regulation involved in
City of Akron, the testing provision is necessary to effectuate the State's interest
in potential human life of viable fetuses. Id.
109. Id. at 3071.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
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Blackmun acknowledged that, under some circumstances, the State's
interest in potential human life may justify burdening second trimester
abortions.
Justice O'Connor concurred with the plurality in upholding the
testing provision. Like Justice Blackmun and other dissenters, however,
she believed that the plurality's interpretation of the statute does not
conflict with Colautti or City of Akron and provides no basis for
reexamining the Roe trimester framework."' While agreeing with the
plurality that the purpose of the Missouri testing statute is to protect
potential human life, she felt that this purpose does not place the
statute in conflict with the Roe trimester framework. Similar to Justice
Blackmun's discussion of the statute's validity under the Roe frame-
work, Justice O'Connor based her finding of validity on the absence, in
prior abortion decisions by the Court, of any holding that a State may
not promote its interest in potential human life when viability is
possible." 2 She looked to Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists1 3 as supporting the power of a state to promote
this interest. In Thornburgh, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania
statute requiring the presence of a second physician during an abortion
performed after viability. Justice O'Connor suggested that the statute
was struck down only because. of the absence of any exception for
emergency situations and not because any difference exists between
promotion of the State's interest when viability is possible and when it
is certain."4 The Thornburgh majority made no statement that the
State's interest may differ in these two situations. Justice O'Connor
viewed this as an indication that all nine members of the Court agreed
111. Justice O'Connor finds that the first sentence of the testing provision
arguably conflicts with the decisions in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth and
with Colautti. The presumption of viability at twenty weeks may be seen as
restricting the judgment of a physician by requiring that the presumption be
overcome before an abortion may be performed. Justice O'Connor points out,
however, that she believes such an argument would be unsuccessful and, in any
event, the question is not before the Court because the appellees did not appeal
the district court's ruling that the first sentence is constitutional. 109 S. Ct. at
3061.
112. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion criticizes the concept of a State's
"interest in potential life when viability is possible." Id. at 3066 n.4. He points
out that by definition viability only involves the possibility that the fetus is
capable of life outside the womb. He therefore concludes that the concept
alluded to by Justice O'Connor is a "possibility of a possibility of survivability
outside the womb." Id.
113. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
114. 109 S. Ct. at 3063.
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that a state may regulate abortion to protect its interest in potential life
when viability is possible but not certain.
115
Justice O'Connor found no conflict existing between the testing
provision and the statement in Colautti that "neither the legislature nor
the courts may proclaim one of the elements entering into the ascertain-
ment of viability ... as the determinant of when the State has a
compelling interest ... . Viability is the critical point."'116  The
plurality's interpretation only requires a physician to make subsidiary
findings as to viability and Justice O'Connor felt this makes it clear that
section 188.029 does not violate Colauttis rule that viability is the
"critical point."117
Likewise, Justice O'Connor found no conflict with the holding in
City of Akron that a state may not impose a "heavy and unnecessary,
burden" on a woman's abortion rights. She reached this conclusion by
applying the standard for evaluating regulation of pre-viability
abortions she expressed in her dissent in City of Akron. In that case,
she suggested that "a regulation imposed on a lawful abortion is not
unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abor-
tion."118 Similar to the analysis of Justice Blackmun, Justice O'Con-
nor found that the testing procedure, contrary to the statute involved in
City ofAkron, does not violate the unduly burdensome standard because
it will only marginally, if at all, increase the cost of an abortion."
9
Justice O'Connor pointed out that unlike the statute in City of Akron
which applied to all second trimester abortions, section 188.029 applies
only when viability is possible. Additionally, she found that her
interpretation of the Thornburgh decision makes the State's interest in
determination of viability compelling whereas the hospitalization
requirement in City of Akron involved no such compelling interest."o
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Colautti, 439 U.S. at 388-89).
117. Id.; Justice Scalia disagrees with this analysis. He finds the principle
expressed in Colautti and Danforth that viability must be a matter for the
determination of the physician is violated by section 188.029. He believes
section 189.029 requires in some instances that the physician perform tests that
he or she would not otherwise have performed to determine whether a fetus is
viable. Id. at 3066 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring).
118. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
119. 109 S. Ct. at 3063.
120. Id. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion criticizes the "undue burden"
standard used by Justice O'Connor as lacking any basis for determining why the
burden involved here is "due" but the burden in City of Akron is "undue." He
finds that because the financial burden imposed by the Missouri statute is much
less than the one involved in City ofAkron, that case can not be used as a basis
for evaluating the Missouri regulation.
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c. Rejection of the Roe Framework
After noting a conflict between the viability testing provision and
the Roe trimester framework, the plurality described the framework as
a construction of the constitution which has proven "unsound in
principle and unworkable in practice." '' The Court acknowledged the
importance of stare decisis but stated that its importance is reduced in
constitutional cases where change can be effectuated only through the
Court and constitutional amendments.
The plurality condemned the framework on two principle grounds.
First, they stated that the framework is inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion which is cast in general terms and speaks in general principles.
Secondly, they found no reason why a state's interest in protection of
human life should not be as compelling before viability as it is after
viability.
122
The plurality advanced its finding of inconsistency with the
Constitution's general terms and principles by noting that the trimester
and viability elements essential to the framework are not found in the
Constitution. They asserted that the indeterminate bounds of inquiry
involved in the framework have resulted in a "web of legal rules which
have become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations
rather than a body of constitutional doctrine."'23 The plurality also
cited to a comment from Justice White's dissent in Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth.12' In Danforth, Justice White alleged that the intricacies
of the framework have made the Court the country's "ex officio medical
board with the power to approve or disapprove medical and operative
practices and standards throughout the United States."'
'1
To avoid the question of Roe v. Wade's validity, with the attendant
costs that this will have for the Court and the principles of self-
governance, on the basis of a standard that offers 'no guide but the
Court's own discretion'.., merely adds to the irrationality of what we
do today.
Id. at 3066 n.* (quoting Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930)).
121. Id. at 3056 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 546 (1985)). Justice O'Connor disagrees with the plurality that
addressing the Roe framework is required in this case. She does indicate,
however, her continuing belief that the trimester framework of Roe is "problem-
atic." Id. at 3063. In City of Akron, Justice O'Connor described the framework
as "a completely unworkable method of accommodating the conflicting personal
rights and compelling state interests that are involved in the abortion context."
City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 454.
122. 109 S. Ct. at 3056-57.
123. Id. at 3057.
124. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
125. Id. at 99.
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The plurality's second basis for rejecting the Roe framework rested
on their view that there is no reason why a state's interest in potential
human life is not present before viability. The plurality rejected the Roe
framework because it does not recognize such an interest of the state
and sets viability as a rigid line before which the state cannot establish
regulations to protect its interest in potential human life.
126
Justice Blackmun's dissent answered the plurality's first argument
by pointing out that many constitutional doctrines are not found in the
specific language of the Constitution. He used the first amendment's
"actual malice" standard as an example of such a doctrine. These
doctrines, he explained, are not rights protected by the Constitution.
Rather, they are methods by which the scope of constitutional rights are
measured or by which constitutional rights of individuals are balanced
against those of the government.1 27 Justice Blackmun stated that the
Roe framework operates to define and limit the rights underlying
abortion to accommodate, but not destroy, the interests of the state. This
accommodation of individual rights and state interests, he explained,
lies at the heart of constitutional adjudication."2  He provided a
similar answer to the plurality's assertion that the framework has
resulted in abortion law resembling a code of regulations. Justice
Blackmun pointed to the fine distinctions contained in a number of
areas such as the fourth amendment freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. He stated further that the Court has no more
been established as an "ex officio medical board" by virtue of its abortion
decisions than it has become a national school board due to its decisions
involving religion in the public schools or become the bureau of prisons
through its decisions concerning prison regulations. 129  Justice
Blackmun felt the intricacy of abortion law has developed not because
the court has overstepped its judicial role, rather, because it has acted
conscientiously to do careful justice to the fundamental rights in-
volved.J'
Justice Blackmun strongly criticized the plurality for not providing
greater explanation for their assertion that a state has a compelling
interest in potential life throughout pregnancy. He characterized the
lack of explanation as "it-is-so-because-we-say-so jurisprudence. 1 31
Justice Blackmun answered the plurality's assertion that a state has a
compelling interest throughout pregnancy by citing the opinion of
Justice Stevens in Thomburgh. Therein, Stevens wrote, "The develop-
126. 109 S. Ct. at 3057.
127. Id at 3072-73.
128. Id. at 3073.
129. Id. at 3074.
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ment of a fetus-and pregnancy itself-are not static conditions, and the
assertion that the government's interest is static simply ignores this
reality.'
32
Justice Blackmun reaffirmed his belief in the effectiveness and
fairness of the trimester framework and, in particular, the use of the
viability line. He contended that prior to the point of viability the fetus
cannot survive without the woman, therefore, it cannot be seen as
having rights separate from or superior to those of the woman.' 3 He
pointed out that the viability line marks the place in time where the
fetus loses its dependence on the uterine environment. Therefore, he
concluded it is only at this point that the state's interest in the
protection of potential human life becomes compelling.'3
Justice Blackmun also faulted the plurality's analysis for not
addressing what he felt was the true issue underlying- this case:
whether the constitutional general right to privacy recognized in
decisions such as Griswold and Roe extends to abortion. Justice
Blackmun stated that the issues surrounding these privacy rights are
"questions of unsurpassed significance in this Court's interpretation of
the Constitution."'3 5 It was his belief that the plurality should have
decided this case on those grounds.
The plurality answered this criticism by distinguishing Griswold
from the Roe decision on the basis that Griswold, unlike Roe, contains
no framework full of rules and regulations to be followed in interpreting
the nature of the right involved. 1" They also justified their hesitancy
to address this issue by stating that the problems in applying Roe show
that it is wise to avoid unnecessarily distinguishing between "a
'fundamental right' to abortion, as the Court described it in Akron, ...
a limited fundamental constitutional right' which Justice Blacknun's
dissent [in Webster] treat[ed] Roe as having established,. . . or a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause, which [the plurality]
believe[d] it to be."'137
132. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778-79.
133. 109 S. Ct. at 3075.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 3072.
136. Id. at 3057-58.
137. Id. at 3058 (citations omitted). Justice Rehnquist similarly defined the
right involved in abortion as a "liberty interest" in his dissenting opinion in Roe
v. Wade, and stated that laws in the abortion area were subject only to the
rational basis test. He stated:
If the Court means by the term "privacy" no more than that the claim
of a person to be free from unwanted state regulation of consensual
transactions may be a form of "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, there is no doubt that similar claims have been upheld
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d. The "Permissibly Furthers" Standard
After finding the Roe trimester framework no longer applicable, the
plurality replaced it with its own "permissibly furthers" standard. The
plurality upheld the constitutionality of the viability testing provision
because it "permissibly furthers the State's interest in protecting
potential human life.""38 Although it discarded the framework of Roe,
the plurality stated that it modified and narrowed only the holding in
Roe and did not overrule that decision. They found the Missouri
statute, which uses viability as the point at which to assert its interest,
too factually dissimilar from the statute in Roe, which prohibited all
nontherapeutic abortions, to fully reconsider the Roe decision.139
Justice Blackmun disputed the basis for this distinction and
concluded that the "permissibly furthers" standard is in effect equiva-
lent to the rational basis test, the most lenient level of review for
evaluating abortion regulations. He found that adoption of such a
standard would overrule Roe for all practical purposes. 40 He felt the
plurality's standard violates every principle established in Roe and
ignores the protection in that decision of what he called every woman's
"limited fundamental constitutional right to decide whether to terminate
a pregnancy."' 4 ' Justice Blackmun concluded it is the plurality's view
that the interest of the .state becomes compelling at conception. He
claimed that this position allows for every regulation restricting
abortion to be upheld as a "permissible" furtherance of the State's
interest in potential human life. Therefore, he determined that the
plurality's assertion that Roe lies undisturbed by its decision because of
factual differences between the Missouri statute and the one involved
in Roe is a distinction without a difference. He felt that under the
plurality's analysis the statute involved in Roe could be upheld as
"permissibly furthering" the interest of the state.142
The dissent felt the adoption of the "permissibly furthers" test
reveals the ultimate objective of the plurality: the return of abortion
in our earlier decisions on the basis of that liberty.... But that
liberty is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against
deprivations without due process of law. The test traditionally
applied in the area of social and economic legislation is whether or not
a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a valid state
objective.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 175 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
138. 109 S. Ct. at 3057.
139. Id. at 3058.
140. Id. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 3077.
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law to its pre-Roe state. The dissents analysis led it to suggest that
through the "permissibly furthers" standard the plurality implicitly
invited state legislatures to enact more restrictive abortion regulations
and to seek to assert the state's interest at the point of conception.'43
The dissent believed that this invitation was made with the hope that
new test cases would arise so the Court could overrule Roe v. Wade
totally and return the ability to place the severe limitations on abortions
to the states.14
In answering this accusation, the plurality admitted that its opinion
renders some regulation of abortion permissible that would be found
unconstitutional under the logic of previous abortion decisions.i 45 The
plurality found that the new participation of legislatures in this area
which is allowed by its holding is consistent with the goal of c6nstitu-
tional adjudication. It said that such a procedure ."hold[s] true the
balance between that which the Constitution puts beyond the reach of
the democratic process and that which it does not."' 46 The assumption
of the dissent that state legislatures will use the plurality's holding to
return to severe restrictions on abortions was attacked by the plurality
because it "not only misread[] [its] views but [the dissent did] scant
justice to those who serve in such bodies and the people who elect
them."'47 This statement suggests that the dissent was incorrect in
its finding that the ultimate purpose of the plurality's holding was to
initiate a process that will return abortion law to its pre-Roe state.
Justice Blackmun's dissent also directed criticism at the lack of
discussion by the plurality concerning the effect of its holding. Justice
Blackmun defined the right of reproductive choice as "vital to the full
participation of women in the economic and political walks of American
life."' 48  He criticized the plurality for not providing a greater
explanation of why it "cast into darkness" the beliefs of women who
have structured their lives around the right to reproductive choice.
Additionally, the plurality was criticized for not addressing the
disastrous results which are likely to occur when women ignore the law
and seek out back-alley abortionists or attempt to perform abortions
upon themselves. Justice Blackmun called the lack of consideration
given to both of these areas "callous" and found the plurality's silence
on these issues destructive to the Court as an institution.i49
143. Id. at 3067.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 3058 (plurality opinion).
146. Id. at 3058.
147. Id. at 3058.
148. Id. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 3078.
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Justice Blackmun also stated that special justification is needed to
depart from stare decisis, which he stated applied with unique force in
this case because of the nature of the rights involved. He found this
special justification lacking in the plurality's opinion because of the
plurality's silence about the impact of their decision on women who have
come to believe that they possess certain abortion rights.l' Justice
Blackmun believed that the lack of explanation by the plurality and its
unjustified departure from stare decisis invited deserved criticism of the
Court. Such criticism was based on "cowardice and illegitimacy" in
dealing with what he called "the most politically divisive domestic legal
issue of our time."1
51
Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion which, while
agreeing with the results reached on the specific issues before the court,
criticized the plurality for not going further and explicitly overruling
Roe v. Wade. The effect of the Missouri statute cannot, in Justice
Scalia's view, be decided on statutory or procedural grounds in order to
avoid deciding the constitutionality of the statute. He found this
inquiry not limited, as Justice O'Connor suggested, by the rule that
constitutional questions should be avoided when possible. Rather, he
found guidance from the principle that a rule of constitutional law
would not be formulated which is broader than is necessary to decide
the case in question.
52
Justice Scalia found that this principle applied to the Court's
examination of the viability testing statute. He then stated that valid
and compelling reasons exifted which brought the case within the
exception allowing departure- from the principle for good cause.1 3
Foremost among the reasons Justice Scalia asserted in support of this
departure is his belief that the questions in this area are mainly
political and not judicial. He felt that maintaining the Court's
involvement in this area will distort the public's view of the role of the
Court. The public will then subject the members of the Court to the
types of public pressures from which the judiciary properly should be
insulated and which are best reserved for political institutions.16
150. Id.
151. Id. at 3079.
152. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 3065. The origins of this exception are traced by Justice Scalia
as far back as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Justice Scalia
points out that the exception permitting a broader holding than necessary has
been permitted even in cases where the identical result could be reached by
applying the rule displaced by the broader holding. See, e.g., Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, reh'g denied, 463
U.S. 1237 (1983).
154. 109 S. Ct. at 3064-65 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia contended that the nature of the abortion issue also
justified departure from the "no broader than necessary" principle. He
pointed out that, unlike most cases in which the party injured by the
Court's failure to adopt a broader holding can challenge the holding
himself, the harm which many feel is done by allowing unrestricted
abortions does not lend itself to this solution.
55
The Court's hesitancy to overrule Roe in this case led Justice Scalia
to question how anything more than minor problematic aspects of Roe
can ever be reconsidered unless the Court is faced with a statute which
directly violates its principles. "It thus appears that the mansion of
constitutionalized abortion-law, constructed overnight in Roe v. Wade,
must be disassembled door-jamb by door-jamb, and never entirely
brought down, no matter how wrong it may be.
'W
B. The Changing Standard
While obviously disagreeing on the treatment of the specific issues,
both the plurality and dissenting opinions agreed that the Court's
decision invites state legislatures to pass more restrictive abortion
regulations. 157 Arguably, this invitation did not come because of any
dramatic effect Webster had on the specific regulation areas involved in
the case. The Court upheld the Preamble by finding it to be a "value
judgment" allowable under current abortion law. It left open the
possibility of finding the Preamble unconstitutional if it is applied to
restrict abortion rights.'5 The Court left the abortion counseling area
untouched by finding the dispute in that area moot. 59 Much discus-
sion surrounded the viability testing provisions, but five Justices found
that the provisions could be upheld on noncontroversial grounds
consistent with the Roe trimester framework and prior abortion
cases."6 The decision did extend the holding of Maher that a state is
not required to fund abortions by applying that principal to uphold the
ban on use of public facilities. As Justice O'Connor pointed out,
however, one reason the provision was upheld was that only a facial
challenge to the statute was involved. Some potential applications of
the statute may be unconstitutional.' 6 ' The invitation to state
legislatures seems to come, then, not from changes in the specific areas
155. Id. at 3066.
156. Id. at 3067.
157. Id. at 3058 (plurality opinion); id. at 3067 (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 3050.
159. Id. at 3053-54.
160. Id. at 3060-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 3071 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); id. at 3079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Id. at 3059-60.
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dealt with in the case, but from the indications of a shift in how the
Court will evaluate future abortion regulations.
Roe v. Wade established the abortion decision as a fundamental
right.16 2 Therefore, the Court in its pre-Webster decisions applied the
strict judicial scrutiny and compelling state interest test in evaluating
abortion regulations. Under this test, a state's interest in protection of
maternal health is not "compelling" until the second trimester of
pregnancy. Abortion regulations are evaluated as either reasonably
related to this compelling interest or as an unconstitutional burden on
abortion.
163
The dissenters in pre-Webster cases, however, disagreed with the
use of strict scrutiny and proposed two alternative tests. One test,
advanced by Justicep White and Rehnquist, asserted that the rights
involved in abortion were not "fundamental," therefore, only a "rational
relationship" need exist between an abortion regulation and the state
interest involved.'6 Justice White indicated in his Thornburgh
dissent that this test would achieve the desirable result of allowing
outright prohibition of abortion by the states.'6 Justice O'Connor
expressed the second alternative, the "undue burden" standard, in her
dissent in City of Akron.'" Under this standard, strict scrutiny is not
applied in every case. The Court is to first determine whether the state
law bears a rational relationship to a compelling state interest, then, it
should apply strict scrutiny only if the statute has "unduly burdened"
the abortion decision.
167
Part of the significance of the Webster decision seems to be that five
Justices indicated they are no longer willing to apply the strict scrutiny
test in every case. These five Justices all agreed that the standard
should be something less than strict scrutiny but they disagreed on the
exact formulation of the standard. The three Justices of the plurality
pointed to the "permissibly furthers" test; Justice Scalia seemingly
would apply no test or at the very most a "rational basis" test; and
Justice O'Connor reaffirmed her "undue burden" standard. The limits
of the "permissibly furthers" standard used by the plurality are difficult
to determine. The plurality did not expand on this standard and only
stated that the Missouri viability testing provision is valid because it
"permissibly furthers the State's interest in protecting potential human
162. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
163. Id. at 163-64.
164. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 788-97 (White, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Roe,
410 U.S. at 173-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
165. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 796 (White, J., dissenting).
166. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 452-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 462-66.
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life."' 6 The plurality answered the dissent's charge that the "permis-
sibly furthers" test will send abortion law back to the "dark ages" by
saying the dissent has "misread" its views. 169 This may imply that the
plurality has adopted a standard somewhat more restrictive than the
rational basis test supported by Justices White and Rehnquist in their
earlier dissents.
The dissenters in Webster may have hinted that they also will
change the way they examine abortion regulations. Although they
reaffirmed Roe and the framework it adopted, they characterized the
right for the first time as a "limited fundamental constitutional right to
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy."'1i Like the plurality, the
dissent did not discuss this characterization, making it difficult to
determine what effect, if any, the dissent gave to defining the right as
"limited." A possible indication of change is contained in Justice
Blackmun's assertion that the viability testing provision as interpreted
by the plurality does not violate Roe. He felt that the testing would
have the effect of increasing costs of some second trimester abortions.
He claimed, however, that the extra costs involved are "merely
incidental to, and a necessary accommodation of, the State's unques-
tioned right to prohibit nontherapeutic abortions after the point of
viability.' 17' This is the first time state intrusion into second trimes-
ter abortions for the purpose of furthering the interest in potential
human life has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
Justice O'Connor's "undue burden" standard lies between the
opposing views of the dissent and the plurality. Assuming the plur-
ality's adoption of a "permissibly furthers" standard and the dissent
labeling abortion rights "limited fundamental constitutional rights"
represent changes in the way they will evaluate abortion regulation in
the future, movement toward the middle to Justice O'Connor's view has
occurred. This movement indicates that examination of future abortion
regulation, while not falling to the leniency of the "rational basis
standard," will be conducted under a standard less restrictive than the
strict scrutiny applied in the past.
168. 109 S. Ct. at 3057.
169. Id. at 3058.
170. Id. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 3071.
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III. THE APPROACH OF OTHER STATES REGARDING ISSUES
ADDRESSED IN WEBSTER
A. The Determination of When Life Begins
In Roe, the Court acknowledged the strongly held, opposing views
on the abortion controversy, 172 much of which grows out of divergence
in thinking on the question of when life begins. The Court considered
itself in no better position to answer that question than all the others
who had tried or declined to do so. 173 It indicated that if a state
.believed itself to be in a position to answer the question of when life
begins, it could do so, provided that the state did not use this determi-
nation to override the woman's right to privacy-namely, to have an
abortion. 174
Eight states175 have statutes expressing views similar, at least in
part, to those in Missouri's Preamble. All are contained within broad
abortion control acts and all indicate an intention to protect the
unborn.
17 6
Only two states, Illinois and Louisiana, specifically address when
life begins. Their very similar statutes find that "the unborn child is a
human being from the time of conception" and declare that the unborn
child is "a legal person for the purposes of... the right to life from
conception under the laws and Constitution of this State."17 7 When
challenged, the Illinois statute was upheld by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. The court found the statute lawful because of language
contained in it which stated the legislative intent to regulate abortion
only when such was in conformance with the decisions of the Supreme
172. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
173. I& at 159.
174. Id. at 162.
175. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-31a (West 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 81-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.710 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.0 (West Supp. 1989);
MONJT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-102 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-325(1) (1985); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-01 (1981); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3202(a) (Purdon 1983).
176. The Missouri Preamble is located in a different section of the revised
statutes than the provisions specifically regulating abortion. However, the
preamble was included in the comprehensive bill enacted by the General
Assembly "to repeal sections [of Missouri's revised statutes] relating to unborn
children and abortion, and to enact . . . new sections relating to the same
subject." H.R. 1596, 83rd Gen. Ass., 2nd Sess., 1986 Mo. Laws 689.
177. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.0 (West Supp. 1989).
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Court."8 The statute also indicated explicitly that it was not in any
way to restrict a woman's right to privacy, including the right to an
abortion.
179
One other state, Connecticut, indicates the moment of conception
is the point at which the State's interest in protecting and preserving
human life begins."s° In Abele v. Marke,'8 ' however, this provision
was held to be an unconstitutional abridgement of a woman's right to
an abortion. The court reasoned that while the State may regulate the
manner in which abortions are performed, it may not prohibit them.
The statute in question, the intent of which is to protect and preserve
life from the moment of conception, arguably acts as such a prohibition.
The Webster decision did not change, but rather clarified the Roe
holding that States wishing to adopt a view of when life begins may do
so only if that view is not used to justify the regulation of abortion.
This clarification likely will have little impact. The issue of whether an
abortion regulation is an impermissible definition of when life begins
seldom has been the subject of litigation. To be consistent with the
principle laid down in Roe and reaffirmed in Webster, a statute would
need to expressly indicate that it is to be applied in a manner consistent
with all decisions of the Supreme Court and the United States Constitu-
tion."2 Webster did not change the results reached in the cases
involving the Illinois and Connecticut statutes.
18
178. Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 779 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand, 579 F.
Supp. 377 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
179. Id. at 778-79, 779 n.8.
180. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-31a (West 1985).
181. Abele v. Marke, 351 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Conn.), stay granted, 409
U.S. 908, motion to vacate denied, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972), stay vacated, 410 U.S.
964, vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 940, on
remand, 369 F. Supp. 807 (D. Conn. 1973).
182. Section 1.205.2 of the Missouri statute provides:
the laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowl-
edge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of developmenit, all
the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons,
citizens and residents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of
the United States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the
United States Supreme Court.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2 (1986). Section 188.010 indicates: "It is the intention
of the general assembly of the state of Missouri ... to regulate abortion to the
full extent permitted by. the Constitution of the United States, decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, and federal statutes." Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.010
(1986).
183. However, one may argue that the Connecticut statute is simply an
expression by that state which favors childbirth over abortion, and that it is
therefore constitutional. This rationale was used to uphold the Missouri
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Statutes such as those in Illinois and Louisiana which declare that
a fetus is a legal person appear to be contrary to the decision in Roe and
its analysis of the meaning of "person" as used in the United States
Constitution. Viewing the fetus as a person places states and courts in
the position of having to choose between the interests of two persons.
When abortion is at issue, this might involve having to choose between
the lives of two persons.
The Court has not decided the constitutionality of statutory grants
of other rights to fetuses. Nevertheless, rights such as tort recovery for
prenatal injuries, prenatal inheritance, and other devolution of property
have been accepted by several courts." 4  Similar fetal rights which
Preamble. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. In order to reach this
result applying Webster, it would be necessary to establish that the Connecticut
statute does not expressly regulate a woman's right to an abortion.
184. In Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distrib., 697 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985), a Texas appellate court allowed recovery to the mother of a deceased
unborn child, in her parental capacity, for the wrongful death of a four month
old fetus. For a discussion of the history of judicial response to actions for
prenatal injury resulting in death, see Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal
Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REv. 639 (1980); Note, A Wrongful Death
Action Can Be Maintained for Prenatal Injuries Causing the Stillbirth of a
Fetus: Witty v. American General Capital Distributors, 17 TEX. TECH. L. REv.
983 (1986). Departing from precedent, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts prospectively held in Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d
1324 (1984), that a viable fetus constituted a person under the Massachusetts
vehicular homicide statute. Id. at 801,467 N.E.2d at 1326. See Note, Criminal
Law-Viable Fetus is Person for Purposes of Massachusetts Vehicular Homicide-
Commonwealth v. Cass Statute, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 145 (1985).
A majority of courts which have ruled on the issue recognize a right to
recover for injuries inflicted before birth. While some courts do not allow
recovery for harm inflicted before the fetus is viable, recent trends suggest most
eventually will allow prenatal tort actions for harm negligently inflicted any
time between conception and birth. Note, Negligent Infliction of Prenatal Death:
New York's Uncompensated Injury after Tebbutt v. Virostek, 19 CONN. L. REV.
365, 377 (1987).
A United States District Court in Connecticut held that recent and well-
established trends in state courts have "expanded the legal rights of the viable
fetus in a wide variety of contexts." Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F. Supp.
1267, 1270 (D. Conn. 1982). In that case, a child was allowed to assert a claim
for injuries received as a result of alleged police brutality against his mother
while she was pregnant. Id. The court held that a viable fetus is a person
within the meaning of title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code. Douglas,
542 F. Supp. at 1270.
In People v. Monson, No. M-508197 (Cal. 1986), criminal charges were filed
against a woman for failing to follow the instructions of her physician and thus,
allegedly contributing to the death of her unborn child. This case reflects an
emerging trend by courts and legislatures to recognize that a fetus has rights
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required perfection by live birth were recognized by Roe. 18
B. Limitations on the Use of Public Resources
A popular way legislatures have attempted to restrict the availabil-
ity of abortion has been through restrictions of funding for abortion
services. The Supreme Court has upheld the ability of a state's
legislature to act in this capacity within the framework of Maher,
Poelker, and Harris.
Missouri statutes sections 188.205 to 188.215 reflect the attempts
of one state to remove itself from the business of assisting abortions.
Other states have adopted statutes concerning public funds and
facilities that are similar to the Missouri provisions upheld by the Court
in Webster. Of course, the question that must be asked is what effect,
if any, Webster will have upon these various statutes, many of which
have been declared unconstitutional by court decisions preceding
Webster.
For.purposes of this discussion, state statutes that limit or restrict
abortion funding can be classified into three general areas. First, there
are states that prohibit the use of public facilities to some degree to
obtain abortions."8 6 Second, states might restrict to some degree the
use of public funds to pay for abortions. 8 7 A third group of states
separate from those of its mother. Comment, A New Crime, Fetal Neglect: State
Intervention to Protect the Unborn-Protection at What Cost?, 24 CAL. W.L. REV.
161 (1987-88); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the
Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REv. 994 (1988).
185. Roe, 410 U.S. at 731.
186. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1630,48-2212 (1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-
881 (Harrison Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.34.5 (West Supp. 1989); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 188.215 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-0.4 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3215 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34-23A-15
(repealed 1982).
187. The Allen Guttmacher Institute in Washington D.C. has compiled a list
of thirty-seven states that restrict to some degree the use of state funds to pay
for abortions. These states include: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. The Allen
Guttmacher Institute, An Analysis of State Laws Enacted Since 1973 That Have
Provisions Similar to Those Challenged In the Webster Case (June, 1989). The
authors of this Note discovered sixteen states that have codified these
restrictions. These include the following: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.02
199o0
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attempt to place policy restrictions upon insurance coverage that pays
for abortion services."s Webster only dealt with the issues of public
facilities and counseling. An overview of the entire statutory scheme
regarding the use of public funds for abortion services may assist in
determining the impact of Webster on existing and future statutory law.
1. The Use of Public Facilities for Abortion Services
While not numerous, the Missouri law restricting abortion in public
facilities is not without its counterpart in other states. These restric-
tions can be broken down into two general groups. Kentucky,'89 North
Dakota,' 9° and Pennsylvania' 9' have enacted statutes that, like
Missouri's statute, prohibit abortions in publicly owned hospitals or
health care facilities. Arizona 92 and Georgia'9 3 prohibit the use of
educational facilities, state built clinics, and public schools in perform-
ing or assisting in the performance of abortions.
a. Publicly Owned Hospitals and Health Care Facilities
In 1980 the Kentucky legislature amended Kentucky Revised
Statute section 311.800 to prohibit "publicly owned hospital[s] or other
publicly owned health care facilit[ies]" from performing or permitting
the performance of abortions "except to save the life of the pregnant
woman.1'194  Similar to Missouri's statute, Kentucky provided for
injunctive action for "any resident of the county in which" there is a
(1990); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26-4-105.5, 26-15-104.5 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 56-
209c (Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3:3 (Burns 1983); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 311.715 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1299.34.5
(West Supp. 1989); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.205 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1
(West 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-01 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5101.55 (Anderson 1989); 18, 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215, § 453 (Purdon
1983 & Supp. 1989); S.D. CODFIED LAWS ANN. § 28-6-4.5 (1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 26-18-4, 26-18-10, 76-7-322, 76-7-323 (1989 & Supp. 1989); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 32.1-92.1, to -92.2 (1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 20.927, 59.07(136),
66.04(1)(m) (West 1986, 1988 & Supp. 1989); WYo. STAT. § 35-6-117 (1977).
188. IDAHO CODE §§ 41-2142, 41-2210A, 41-3439 (Supp. 1989); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3215(e) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 27-18-28, 36-12-2.1 (1989
& 1984).
189. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983).
190. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-04 (1981).
191. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215 (Purdon 1983).
192. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1630 (1984).
193. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-881 (Harrison Supp. 1989).
194. Act effective April 4, 1980, ch. 225, § 1, 1980 Ky. Acts 684-85.
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publicly owned hospital or health care facility that is violating the
ban. 95
While narrower in its scope of restriction, North Dakota aims for
the same goal as Missouri and Kentucky. The North Dakota statute
prohibits the performance of "an abortion in a hospital owned, main-
tained, or operated within the state" unless "necessary to prevent" the
woman's death.'9
Like Missouri, Pennsylvania to some degree has a broader statute
in its degree of exclusion. The Pennsylvania statute provides that "[n]o
hospital, clinic or other health facility owned or operated" by the state,
a county, or other government body except the United States is allowed
to "[p]rovide, induce, perform or permit its facilities to be used" to obtain
abortions except when the mother's life is endangered by the pregnancy.
Unlike the Kentucky, Missouri, and North Dakota laws, Pennsylvania's
statute provides an exemption in the event the pregnancy results from
rape or incest.'9 7
In comparison, the statutes of all four states are directed at the
prevention of abortion procedures in public hospitals and public
facilities. The scope of this prevention is varied, however. Missouri's
statute is directed at any "public facility."'98 Kentucky's statutes are
directed at "publicly-owned hospitals" or publicly owned health care
facilities.99 Pennsylvania's statute provides the same degree of
exclusion.2 ° Only North Dakota's statute prohibits abortions solely
at "publicly owned hospitals."20 1 The statutes also vary as to the
degree of punishment. The laws in Kentucky, North Dakota, and
Pennsylvania all make a violation of their statute a misdemeanor
offense.2 2  Missouri's statute has no provision for punishment.
During oral arguments at the Supreme Court in Webster, however,
Missouri's attorney general indicated his belief that violation of
Missouri's statute would not be a misdemeanor.2°' The Missouri and
Kentucky statutes both provide private causes of action while North
195. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983).
196. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-04.(1981).
197. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(c)(2) (Purdon 1983).
198. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.215 (1986).
199. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(1), (2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983).
200. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3215(a) (Purdon 1983).
201. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-04 (1981).
202. See K . REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.990(19) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-05 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(n)
(Purdon 1983).
203. N. Y. Times, April 27, 1989, at B12, col. 2.
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Dakota and Pennsylvania do not.2' Only Missouri's statute has been
challenged on facial constitutionality.
b. Educational Facilities, State-built Clinics,
and Public Schools
Both Arizona 2 5 and Georgia2m have restricted the ability to
perform abortions in educational facilities but to different degrees.
Arizona's law focuses upon the use of state universities and college
facilities in performing abortions. Georgia has similar restrictions that
focus upon public schools.
Arizona's statute prohibits the performance of abortions "at any
facility under the jurisdiction of the Arizona Board of Regents" unless
the abortion is necessary to save the mother's life.2°7 In effect, the law
prohibits abortions at Arizona public educational facilities with that one
exception. In Roe v. Arizona Board of Regents,2°s a nineteen year old
unmarried female in the second trimester of pregnancy sought to have
the Arizona prohibition declared unconstitutional. The Arizona
Supreme Court rejected this challenge: "Even as plaintiff does not have
an absolute right to an abortion on demand, she also does not have a
right to select any public facility she chooses for an abortion."' °  The
court reasoned that if there are alternative and adequate public
facilities available to her, the woman's right of choice has been
protected. Therefore, she cannot complain that she would rather have
the abortion performed at a different facility.
2 10
Georgia's statute provides that "[n]o facility operated on public
school property or operated by a public school district and no employee
of any such facility acting within the scope of such employee's employ-
ment shall provide [the] ... (2) [plerformance of abortions."21' Passed
in 1988, the statute has yet to face a serious constitutional challenge in
the courts.
Both Arizona and Georgia's statutes are more limited in the scope
of their restriction than Kentucky, Missouri, North Dakota and
Pennsylvania. In all regards, however, the Arizona statute probably has
the same effect as the statutes of the more restrictive states since most
204. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 188.220 (1986).
205. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1630 (1984).
206. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-881 (Harrison Supp. 1989).
207. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1630 (1984).
208. 173 Ariz. 178, 549 P.2d 150 (1976).
209. Id at 180, 549 P.2d at 152.
210. Id.
211. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-881 (Harrison Supp. 1989).
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public hospitals are affiliated with public universities.212 As Roe v.
Arizona Board of Regents pointed out, the constitutionality of Arizona's
statute is hinged upon the availability of "alternative adequate public
facilities" to perform the abortion.
213
2. The Public Funding of Abortions
Of the sixteen states that have codified abortion funding restric-
tions, nine prohibit the use of public funds by statute except when the
life of the mother is endangered. 14 Four states statutorily prohibit
abortion funding except in cases of life endangerment, rape, or in-
cest.2 15 Two states restrict the use of Medicaid to fund abortions,
2 16
while another prohibits funds for abortion except in cases of life
endangerment, rape, incest or severe fetal deformity.21 7 One state,
Colorado, prohibits public funding of abortion in its constitution.
218
The right of states to restrict public funds for the performance of
abortion is hinged upon the Maher-Poelker-Harris framework.2 1 9 The
decision in Webster does not alter this framework; instead it builds upon
it by holding that certain bans upon the use of public employees and
facilities in performing abortions are valid.
3. Medical Insurance Coverage of Abortion
Some states, in addition to restricting state funding of abortions,
also limit the ability of state employees to have elective abortions
provided for under state insurance coverage. For example, Rhode Island
212. It is worth noting that the hospital involved in Webster Truman
Medical Center, was associated with the University of Missouri School of
Medicine. Reproductive Health Servs. I, 662 F. Supp. at 411.
213. S.D. CODIFIED LA s ANN. § 34-23A-15 (repealed 1982).
214. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.02 (1990); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26-4-
105.5, 26-15-104.5 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3.3 (Burns 1989);.KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.34.5 (West Supp. 1989); Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.205 (1986); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.3-01 (1981); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5101.55 (Anderson 1989);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 28-6-4.5 (1986).
215. IDAHO CODE § 56-209c (Supp. 1989); 18, 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3215, § 453 (Pardon 1983 & Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-927,59.07(136),
66.04(1)(m) (West 1986 & 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-117 (1988).
216. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-18-4
(1989).
217. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-92.1, 92.2 (1985).
218. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50.
219. See supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
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excludes "in any health insurance contracts, plans or policies covering
employees [of the state] any provision which shall provide coverage for
induced abortions (except where the life of the mother would be
endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or where the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest)."'
Pennsylvania and Idaho have adopted statutes which require
certain insurance policies to expressly exclude coverage of abortion
services not necessary to save the woman's life or in cases of rape or
incest.2 ' Under these statutes, a woman could still acquire insurance
to cover the expenses of an elective abortion. Yet, she could only do so
by paying a higher premium. This type of provision was upheld in
Thornburgh.'
4. Limitations on the Use of Public Resources:
Post-Webster
The decision in Webster provides a logical extension of previous
decisions by the Supreme Court concerning the use of public financing
for abortion services. Maher, Poel her, and Harris were concerned
primarily with restrictions limited to the area of public funding. On the
other hand, the provisions upheld in Webster dealt specifically with
restrictions on the use of public employees and facilities to assist in the
performance of abortions. Even prior to Webster one might logically
conclude that if public funding for the performance of abortions is
prohibited, such funds could not be used to pay out the salaries of public
employees who perform abortions. One might also logically assume
under the Maher-Poelker-Harris framework that buildings supported or
built by public funds could not be used to facilitate the performance of
abortions. Thus, what might have been implied before is now expressly
permitted as a result of Webster.
The plurality opinion contended that under Maher, Poelker, and
Harris the restriction of public facilities and staff to perform abortions
"places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses
to terminate her pregnancy. "223 According to the plurality, a state's
refusal to provide these services "leaves a pregnant woman with the
same choices as if the State had chosen not to operate any public
hospitals at all."" '
220. R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 27-18-28, 36-12-2.1 (1989).
221. IDAHO CODE §§ 41-2142, 41-2210A, 41-3439 (Supp. 1989); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3215(e) (Purdon 1983).
222. Thornburgh, 552 F. Supp. at 809.
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Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality on this point, but
expressed in her opinion some of the concerns highlighted by the
appellees. O'Connor pointed out that section 188.200(2) defines public
facility as "any public institution, public facility, public equipment, or
any physical asset owned, leased, or controlled by this state or any
agency or political subdivisions thereof."' 2 5 She contended that under
certain situations the ban on the use of such facilities would be
unconstitutional. 6  O'Connor observed that possible constitutional
violations could exist if the state attempts to enforce a ban similar to
Missouri's "'against private hospitals using public water and sewage
lines, or against private hospitals leasing state-owned equipment or
state land."22
Justice O'Connor appeared to stand in the middle of a sharply
divided court on this issue. Therefore, the extent of her analysis is
likely to determine the parameters within which a state legislature may
act to prohibit the use of public facilities for abortion services.
After Webster it seems clear that a state may restrict public
resources of any kind from use in assisting abortions. As in Webster,
this naturally includes public facilities. The definition given to "public
facilities" by a statute may determine the extent of a state's prohibition
under such a provision. Justice O'Connor's opinion is an important
signpost for the interpretation of present and future statutes that deal
with public facilities. These statutes may pass scrutiny under the test
of facial constitutionality. Contrary to the issue addressed in Webster,
however, they may be overreaching in the scope of their restrictions,
thus inviting a different analysis by the court.
The states of Kentucky, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania, which
have adopted statutes similar to Missouri's, limit the scope of abortion
restrictions in such a way that each most likely would be upheld.2 2
The opinion in Webster also seems to uphold the validity of the
225. Id. at 3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
226. Id.
227. Id
228. Kentucky's statute is specifically limited to publicly owned hospitals
and health care facilities. KY. REv. STAT. AirN. § 311.800 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1983). North Dakota's statute is limited to government hospitals. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.3-04 (1981). Pennsylvania's statute deals with any "hospital, clinic
or other health care facility owned or operated by the commonwealth, a country,
a city or other governmental entity (except the government of the United States,
another state or a foreign nation)." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215 (Purdon
1983). At the time of this writing the Pennsylvania House of Representatives
had adopted a new set of abortion restrictions which reaffirmed the state's
commitment to the prohibition of public hospitals from performing abortions,
except to save the woman's life or in cases of rape or incest. St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, Oct. 25, 1989, at 1, 11.
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contention in Arizona Board of Regents that the Arizona statute
restricting abortions from being performed in educational facilities
funded by the state is constitutional.' Such a statute appears to be
permissible so long as it is not overreaching in an attempt to contort its
application to non-public facilities.=
By building upon the Maher-Poelker-Harris framework, the Court
in Webster placed itself alongside the view that "[niothing in the
Constitution requires States to enter or remain in the business of
performing abortions" or that "private physicians and their patients
have some kind of constitutional right of access to public facilities for
the performance of abortions."'2
1
C. The Use of Public Funds and Employees to Counsel
or Encourage Women to Have Abortions
Unlike the public facility restriction, the restrictions on counseling
to encourage abortion has faced stiffer opposition and frequently has
been found unconstitutional prior to Webster. The major challenge to
this type of state statute has been possible first amendment violations.
As the attorney for Reproductive Health Services stated in his argument
to the Supreme Court in Webster, "It touches upon the free speech
aspects of both the physician and the patient and, secondly, it clearly
touches upon the... fundamental right.., of abortion." 
2
Two states whose prohibitions against counseling women on
abortion have never been challenged are Georgia and Louisiana.
Georgia has the less inclusive statute. It mandates that no employee in
Georgia's public school system shall provide "[r]eferrals for abor-
tion." Under the Georgia statute, it appears that a public school
229. Webster's plurality holds that "[n]othing in the Constitution requires
states to enter or remain in the business of performing abortions." 109 S. Ct.
at 3052. Justice O'Connor seems to hold this belief as well. Id. at 3059. Thus,
it appears that the concern expressed by the Arizona Supreme Court in Roe v.
Arizona Board of Regents that the constitutionality of Arizona's statute is hinged
upon the availability of "alternative adequate public facilities" to perform the
abortion finds no merit in the Webster court. Roe v. Arizona Board of Regents,
113 Ariz. at 180, 549 P.2d at 152. Justice O'Connor is concerned about public
intrusions into the rights of private facilities to perform abortions, not with the
curtailment of abortion by public facilities in general. 109 S. Ct. at 3059.
230. 109 S. Ct. at 3059-60.
231. Id. at 3052.
232. N. Y. Times Nat'l, Apr. 27, 1989, at 6, col 3.
233. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-881(a)(3) (1988).
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employee may advise a student on the feasibility of an abortion but may
not refer that student to an abortion facility to obtain the abortion. 
2
M
The Louisiana statute is more restrictive. It prohibits all employees
of the state or any person receiving "governmental assistance" for work
to "require or recommend that any woman have an abortion."235 The
Louisiana statute specifically exempts from its coverage physicians who
are "acting to save or preserve the life of the pregnant woman."
Neither the Louisiana nor Georgia statute has been tested in regard to
the first amendment's right to free speech.
Other states adopting similar statutes have been subject to suit
over the free speech issue. Arizona's statute restricting abortion
counseling was struck down in Planned Parenthood v. ArizonaY2 7 In
Planned Parenthood, a footnote to a state appropriations bill "prohibited
state money from being given to agencies or entities which offer
abortions, abortion procedures, 'counseling for abortion procedures,' or
'abortion referrals."= s The district court held that this language of
the appropriations bill "necessarily means that the plaintiffs would be
prohibited from exercising their First Amendment right to disseminate
abortion information. '"2 9 Also, the court found the footnote sufficiently
vague under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
court, in finding the footnote void for vagueness, concluded that because
of the "footnote's ambiguity the plaintiffs will be forced to guess whether
they are in violation of the law."?'0 The court pointed out that the
footnote did not address whether "counseling" refers "to the act of
advocating abortion as an alternative to pregnancy and childbirth, or [if]
it merely refer[s] to voluntarily offering advice on abortion."2' To be
consistent with the bill, the court questioned whether an agency must
refrain from ever mentioning abortion as an alternative when a
pregnant woman seeks advice on the alternatives to pregnancy.?
2
This decision was overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in 1983. 8  Concerning the first amendment claim, the court of
appeals determined "the state of Arizona may not unreasonably
interfere with the right of Planned Parenthood to engage in abortion or
234. Id.
235. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.34 (West Supp. 1989).
236. Id.
237. 537 F. Supp. 90 (D. Ariz. 1982), rev'd, 718 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983),
appeal after remand, 789 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986).
238. Id. at 91.
239. Id at 92.
240. Id.
241. I& at 1348.
242. Id.
243. See Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 718 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983).
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abortion-related speech activities, but the State need not support,
monetarily or otherwise, those activities."m2 Regarding the vagueness
claim, the court reasoned:
we find that 'counseling for abortion procedures' is a more
narrowly drawn term. The term 'abortion procedure' is
commonly used to refer to the actual operation performed by
medical personnel in carrying out the abortion. Thus, the
reasonable person would understand the statute to refuse
funding for counseling activities closely tied to the actual
abortion operation, such as preparing a woman who has
already decided to have an abortion for the medical treatment
she is about to undergo.2
5
The court remanded the case, however, "to give the state the opportuni-
ty to prove that withdrawing all state funds from Planned Parenthood
was the only way to ensure that Planned Parenthood would not use
state funds to support its abortion-related activities."M On remand,
the State did not adequately show that the withdrawal of state funds
was the only way to prevent Planned Parenthood from using state
money for abortion counseling.2 7  Because of alternative methods,
such as monitoring the use of funds by Planned Parenthood, the district
court again ruled the statute unconstitutional." This decision was
upheld by both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court.?
9
A North Dakota statute dealing with the prohibition of state money
for "any person, public or private agency which performs, refers, or
encourages abortion" also was declared unconstitutional in Valley
Family Planning v. North Dakota.' The district court invalidated
the North Dakota statute declaring, "The denial of funds to Valley
Family Planning solely because of its abortion referral activities is an
attempt by the State of North Dakota to produce a result it could not
command directly."2 51 The court found the statute violated the free
expression rights of the first amendment and also determined that it
was unconstitutionally vague under the fourteenth amendment. 2
244. I& at 944.
245. Id at 948-49 (citation omitted).
246. Id, at 946.
247. Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 789 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986).
248. Id at 1348.
249. See id. at 1351, affd mem.,.479 U.S. 925 (1986).
250. 489 F. Supp. 238 (D.N.C. 1980), affd, 661 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1981).
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Missouri's statutes are similar to Louisiana's in that they prohibit
public employees from assisting in abortions. They also resemble the
invalidated North Dakota statute which restricted state funds "for the
purpose of encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion not
necessary to save her life." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Planned Parenthood I and II, reached its conclusion concerning
Arizona's restriction on state funding for abortion counseling in a
different manner than the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' approach in
Valley Family Planning. Nevertheless, in the end, both decisions
reached the same result-that the attempted statutes were unconstitu-
tional.
In Webster, Missouri argued that the scope of section 188.205
should be construed narrowly. The State claimed that the section was
"not directed at the conduct of any physician or health care provider,
private or public;" instead it was "directed solely at those persons
responsible for expending public funds."' In oral argument, Missouri
Attorney General Webster insisted that section 188.205 "does not go to
the speech [of encouraging abortion] but rather is directed at the
entities responsible for expending public funds."2' Faced with this
interpretation, the appellees conceded in their brief that the statute
would not adversely affect them.' The Court accepted this conces-
sion and unanimously agreed that this limited focus of section 188.205
rendered the controversy moot.Y
This decision limits the impact Webster will have, if any, upon
counseling statutes similar to Missouri's. Since Webster did not address
the counseling issue substantively, it appears that prior arguments
raised in the Arizona cases and Valley.Family Planning remain valid.
Therefore, Arizona and North Dakota, which both had similar provisions
struck down, can find no justification in Webster to revive those
statutes.
257
In addition, the first amendments right to free speech may still
protect the right of health care professionals to counsel women on
abortion, even if a counseling provision which prohibits such an action
exists. Therefore, if the statutes in Louisiana or Georgia are to be
interpreted in such a manner as to interfere with these first amendment
rights, they are most likely unconstitutional.
253. 109 S. Ct. at 3053.
254. N. Y. Times Nat'l, Apr. 27, 1989, at 1, col 1.
255. 109 S. Ct. at 3053.
256. Id
257. It appears that Webster at least on this point cannot be considered to
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The only concrete position on which Webster stands concerning this
issue is that state legislatures probably can limit funding for the
counseling of abortion consistent with the Constitution so long as the
focus of that limitation is upon the revenue officers of the state and not
doctors.258 States would be hard pressed to find in Webster justifica-
tion to place restrictive burdens upon state-employed doctors to forbid
counseling a woman about her option of abortion.259
D. The Role of Viability Testing and the Physician
In all abortion decisions, the Court has indicated that a state's
interest in protecting potential life becomes greater than a woman's
right to personal privacy, including the right to an abortion, at the point
the fetus becomes viable. Viability has been held to be a flexible point
which must be assessed by a physician on a case-by-case basis.
Fourteen states have statutory provisions defining a specific
number of weeks into a pregnancy when interest in protection of the
prenatal life becomes greater than interest in the woman's right to
privacy.26 These statutes differ in several respects.
Eight states2 6 appear to accept the invitation issued in Roe to
proscribe abortion after the fetus is viable.26 2 Their definition of when
258. Id at 3053.
259. Id.
260. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-16-703 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790
(1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 390.001(2), 310.011(6) (West 1986); IDAHO CODE § 18-
604(5) (1987); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-208(b)(1) (1987); MASS. GEN.
L. ch. 112, § 12M (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.411 subd. 2 (West 1989); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 442.250 (1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 1987); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(b) (1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-732(B) (West 1984);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211(a) (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(L)
(Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-5 (1986).
261. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790 (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(2)
(West 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-208(b)(1) (1987); MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 112, § 12M (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.250 (1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.05(3) (McKinney 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(b) (1986); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-S (1986).
262. Seven of the eight statutes recognize the requirement in Roe that any
prohibition on post-viability abortion provide for an exception when necessary
to protect or preserve the life or health of the pregnant woman. A physician is
required to make the determination that an exception is necessary in five of
these states. Delaware and Maryland require that authorization for such an
abortion be granted by a hospital review authority appointed by the hospital.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a) (1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-
208(b)(2) (1987). However, according to the Maryland Attorney General this
provision is unconstitutional. See 62 Op. Atty. Gen. 3 (1977). Except when a
[Vol. 55208
46
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 17
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/17
ABORTION LEGISLATION
viability occurs is made implicitly by simply defining a specific number
of weeks into the pregnancy after which abortion is prohibited.
Delaware and North Carolina place the rbstriction at twenty weeks;
Maryland at twenty-six; the others at twenty-four.
The remaining states have express presumptions about viability.
Statutes in Arkansas, Idaho, and South Carolina contain presumptions
that a fetus is not viable "prior to the end of the twenty-fifth week,"
"before the commencement of the twenty-fifth week," and "no- sooner
than the twenty-fourth week" respectively.26 These statutes proscribe
abortion after that point except under certain situations. Idaho provides
an exception only to protect the life of the woman. In addition to an
exception to protect the life or health of the mother, Arkansas allows
post-viability abortions if the pregnancy results from rape or incest per-
petrated on a minor.2' The Idaho presumption is irrebuttable in all
civil or criminal proceedings. Violation of the Arkansas or South
Carolina statutes subjects the violator to criminal sanctions.
The South Carolina statute was held unconstitutional in Floyd v.
Anders.26" The district court ruled that the question of viability is one
of fact. Thus, it determined that legislatures may not fix a particular
date for viability; rather, they must allow the determination to be made
on the basis of each individual fetus.
The Minnesota statute indicates that, "[d]uring the second half of
its gestation period a fetus shall be considered potentially 'viable."
'267
It proscribes abortion after that point unless the attending physician
certifies in writing that the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or
physician certifies in writing that emergency procedures are necessary, Florida
requires that two physicians certify to the fact that a post-viability abortion is
necessary to save the life or preserve the health of the woman. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 390.001(2)(a), (b) (West 1986).
The Delaware provisions also require that two physicians certify that
circumstances warranting such an abortion exist. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §
1790(b)(2) (1988). The New York statute makes an exception to the prohibition
on post-viability abortions only for the preservation of life of the pregnant
woman.,N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3)(b) (McKinney 1987). The Massachusetts
statute does not clearly indicate how it is to be determined that an abortion is
"necessary" after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112,
§ 12L (1983). Florida, Massachusetts, and New York provide criminal sanctions
for violating their statutes.
263. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-16-703 (1987); IDAHO CODE § 18-604(5) (1987);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(L) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
264. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-16-705(c) (1987).
265. 440 F. Supp. 535 (D.S.C. 1977), vacated and remanded, 440 U.S. 445
(1979).
266. Id. at 539.
267. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.411 subd. 2 (West 1989).
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health of the pregnant woman. Violation of the statute is a felony. In
Hodgson v. Lawson,2" this provision was held constitutionally
impermissible because it established a presumption that viability occurs
at the end of the twentieth week of gestation.
The Oklahoma statute presumes the "unborn child to be viable if
more than twenty-four (24) weeks have elapsed from the probable
beginning of the last menstrual period of the pregnant woman. ' A
physician may rebut this presumption through the exercise of his
medical judgment. He must certify in writing the criteria upon which
he determined the fetus was not viable before he can perform any
abortion. If he determines the fetus is viable, he may perform an
abortion only if necessary to prevent the pregnant woman's death or
impairment of health. Violation of this statute is defined as a homi-
cide.270
The Pennsylvania statute27' is most like that of the Missouri
statute upheld in Webster. It requires that a physician determine
whether a fetus is viable when the woman seeking an abortion is beyond
nineteen weeks of pregnancy. The physician's good faith judgment,
rather than any specific test, is adequate for making this determination.
This statute was held unconstitutional in Thornburgh because of its
reporting requirements. The Court believed that such requirements
were designed for the purpose of identifying the woman rather than
advancing any legitimate interestY2  The constitutionality of the
viability determination requirement was not at issue.
Only eight states273 other than Missouri explicitly require any
determination that the fetus is or is not viable before an abortion may
be performed. All defer to the attending physician to exercise his
judgment 4 to establish viability. None requires or even suggests that
the physician conduct tests to make this determination. The Oklahoma
statute indicates the physician may determine the gestational age of the
268. 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976).
269. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-732(B) (West 1984).
270. Id. § 1-732(F).
271. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211(a) (Purdon 1983).
272. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 769 (1986).
273. IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-3[10-109] (1984); IowA CODE § 702.20 (1989);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.4(A) (West Supp. 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
329 (1985); NEv. REV. STAT. § 442.250(2) (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
732(B) (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211(a) (Purdon 1989); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 940.15(2) (West Supp. 1989).
274. In these statutes, the word "judgment" frequently is modified by
adjectives such as "responsible medical," "good faith," "best medical," "sound
medical" and "reasonable medical."
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fetus by relying on information provided by the pregnant woman or by
conducting an examination of her.25  A subjective standard of
certainty is defined for the physician in Nebraska and Nevada.27 6 The
only objective requirements deal with reporting. Pennsylvania requires
that the physician report the basis for his determination.277 Indiana
requires that the physician certify the determination of viability in any
required written reports. Oklahoma requires certification in writing as
to the precise medical criteria upon which a determination of nonvia-
bility is based.28
The Supreme Court has not assessed the constitutionality of a
statute which defines when viability occurs in terms of a specific
number of weeks of gestation. By applying the holding in Colautti,279
however, such a statute probably would be unconstitutional. The law
before Webster did not allow the prohibition of abortions prior to
viability. This has not been changed by the decision in Webster. As
previously discussed, viability is a flexible point determinable by a
physician. Thus, a definition or presumption of viability used as a point
beyond which abortion is proscribed and based only on gestational age
or weeks of pregnancy, is probably an unconstitutional interference with
the physician's case-by-case exercise of professional judgment. This
same result would be reached regardless of whether the definition is
expressed or implied. Applying this to existing law, the statutes of
twelve of the fourteen states ° which define viability in these terms,
would be unconstitutional.
Because Missouri's rebuttable presumption was not at issue before
the Supreme Court, it is uncertain whether it and Pennsylvania's
similar statute would be held constitutional. They appear to be
consistent with previous Court decisions. Each relies on the physician's
medical judgment to determine the viability of the fetus. Rather than
defining viability in terms of gestation, both statutes simply call the
physician's attention to the need to assess viability beginning at a
specific number of weeks of gestation. Justice O'Connor suggests that
such a requirement is not an impermissible restriction on the judgment
of the attending physician.
281
275. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-732(B) (West 1984).
276. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-329 (1985) ("the unborn child clearly appears to
have reached viability"); NEv. REV. STAT. § 442.250(2) (1987) ("there is a
reasonable likelihood of the sustained survival of the fetus").
277. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211(a) (Purdon 1989).
278. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-732(B) (1984).
279. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
280. See statutes cited supra note 260.
281. 109 S. Ct. at 3061.
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The Oklahoma statute presumes the existence of viability at a
specific number of weeks of gestation. This presumption is rebuttable
by the physician who is asked to perform the abortion. Therefore, the
Oklahoma statute provides the required flexibility by continuing to
allow the determination of viability to be made on a case-by-case basis
by a physician. For this reason, it would probably survive constitutional
challenge.
State legislatures which desire to invoke additional restrictions on
abortion are likely to emulate the viability testing provisions of the
Missouri Act. It is not unreasonable to assume that some legislatures
may even attempt to enact stricter requirements in this area than those
contained in the Missouri provision. As Justice Blackmum pointed out
in Webster, a viability testing requirement may be viewed as a means
by which a state seeks to protect its compelling interest to ensure that
no viable fetus is aborted mistakenly.28 2 In 1986, there were 1,987
live births of less than 20 weeks of gestation in the United States.m
Therefore, legislatures may attempt to require viability testing at an
even earlier stage than is provided for under the Missouri standard.
No state other than Missouri requires the physician to inform his
or her medical judgment with findings derived from tests necessary to
determine one or more measures of viability. Because the Supreme
Court indicated this is permissible, it provides another area for future
legislative effort. Assuming that a state considers it important to have
viability of the fetus determined, a statute acknowledging the Court's
holding that this determination is a subjective process made by a
physician exercising medical judgment would be consistent with Webster
and all previous holdings. To be certain that a statute is consistent
with Webster, it would need to suggest to the physician that he choose
appropriate medical technology to make one or more of a variety of
282. 109 S. Ct. at 3070-71.
283. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Vital Statistics of the U.S.
1986, 1 NATALITY 257 (1988). This represented .05% of all live birth in that
year. Id.
In addition to the foregoing, Justice O'Connor points out, "In 1973, viability
before 28 weeks was considered unusual .... However, recent studies have
demonstrated increasingly earlier fetal viability. It is certainly reasonable to
believe that fetal viability in the first trimester of pregnancy may be possible in
the not too distant future." City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 457 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
But see Rhoden, Late Abortion and Technological Advances in Fetal Viability,
17 FAm. PLAN. PERSP., July-Aug. 1985, at 160. ("[The actual situation is that
over the past decade, the threshold of viability has shifted backwards by several
weeks. It may shift further, or it may not. While there are isolated reports of
infants surviving who are born at 23 weeks' gestation, many experts doubt that
the current threshold will be superseded. .. ").
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findings in determining the presence of viability. A statute would be
flawed if it relied on only one finding, if it required that a specific test
be made, or if it required a test which was contraindicated by prevailing
medical standards. Nevertheless, viability testing requirements other
than those specifically discussed in Webster and greater state regulation
of medical practice relative to abortion may be permissible now. The,
Court clearly indicated that regulation in the second trimester may be
done to protect potential life as well as to protect the health of the
pregnant woman.8
4
Despite this likely effect, which will give states more freedom to
invoke stricter abortion regulations, it is not clear what standard will
be used to assess the constitutionality of any new regulation. The
plurality was satisfied that Missouri's testing requirement permissibly
furthers the State's interest in protecting potential life.' Justice
O'Connor appeared to advance that any regulation not impose an undue
burden on the woman's abortion decision. She suggested that a
medically imprudent regulation would be an undue burden.8
CONCLUSION
The decision in Webster addressed the constitutionality of four
provisions of a comprehensive act regulating abortion in Missouri. A
majority of the Court upheld these provisions. Three opinions were
written by these five justices, however, and they showed significant
differences in the rationale used to reach this result.
The Court held that the "Preamble" ' to Missouri's statute, which
declares that the life of each human being begins at conception, is a
permissible expression of a value judgment which does not directly
regulate abortion. Therefore, the Court did not rule on the constitution-
ality of the preamble because the state courts had not yet determined
whether the provision would be applied to regulate the performance of
abortions. 28 7 In addition to the Preamble, the Court upheld separate
provisions of the Missouri Act prohibiting the use of public employees
and public facilities for performing or assisting an abortion not
necessary to save the life of the mother.m The controversy concerning
a restriction on the use of public funds for encouraging or counseling a
284. 109 S. Ct. at 3057.
285. See id.
286. Id at 3063 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra notes 162-71 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the different standards advocated by
members of the Court for use in determining the validity of state abortion
regulations.
287. 109 S. Ct. at 3050; see supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
288. 109 S. Ct. at 3050-53; see supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
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woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life was held to be
moot.28 9 Finally, the Court upheld the requirement that a physician
determine the viability of a fetus by informing his or her professional
judgment with tests useful in making findings relative to fetal age,
weight, and lung maturity.2 °
The most significant part of the Webster decision was not the
holdings on the specific statutory provisions. Rather, one area of
significance concerns the views expressed in regard to the Roe frame-
work, which has undergirded practically every post-Roe decision dealing
with abortion. Another significant area of Webster is the apparently
changing standard used to evaluate the conflicting interests present
when an abortion is considered.
Four of the justices appear ready to overturn the Roe framework,
viewing it as rigid, unsound, and unworkable, resembling regulation
more than constitutional doctrine. Justice O'Connor joined with the
dissenters in saying that the Missouri statute provided no need to re-
examine the Roe framework. While continuing to view viability as the
point at which the interest in protecting potential life dominates a
woman's right to privacy, including the right to an abortion, Justices
O'Connor, Blackmium, Brennan, and Marshall are willing to allow some
second trimester regulation to protect potential life. This is a departure
from a strict adherence to the Roe framework, which allowed second
trimester regulation only to protect the woman's health. This opening
from Webster provides a likely avenue for further regulation of abor-
tions.
A second avenue for additional abortion regulation was provided by
the position of five justices who indicated that in the future they will
use a standard other than strict scrutiny and compelling interest to
assess the constitutionality of statutes regulating abortion. While these
justices do not appear to agree on the exact standard that should be
applied, it is clear that each supports the adoption of a less strict
standard than the one used in pre-Webster cases. Some clarification of
the extent of these changes may be provided later this year when the
Supreme Court decides Hodgson v. Minnesota21 and Akron Center for
Reproductive Health u. Ohio. 9 2 Each concerns the constitutionality
of statutory provisions requiring that notice be provided to the parents
of a minor before she receives an abortion.
All members of the Supreme Court agree that the decision in
Webster may encourage other states to change their abortion laws. It
should come as no surprise then that shortly after the Webster decision
289. 109 S. Ct. at 3053-54; see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
290. 109 S. Ct. at 3054-58; see supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
291. 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988).
292. 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988).
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numerous proposals were made by individual members of the various
state legislatures in an attempt to place further restrictions on abortion.
In November of 1989, Pennsylvania, which already had some of the
most restrictive abortion regulations in the nation prior to Webster,
became the first state to officially make such changes. 3
The new Pennsylvania law, however, did not enact restrictions that
corresponded with the four issues confronted in Webster. Instead, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly focused on the following areas: a ban
on abortions after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy,' require-
ments that the doctor performing the abortion determine the gestational
age of the "unborn child, ,29 a requirement to insure "spousal no-
tice,"m a requirement for the "informed consent" of the woman
submitting to the abortion, 7 and the prohibition of abortions based
solely on the sex of the "child."m
The new Pennsylvania law does provide for an exception to the ban
on abortions performed after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy. The
ban does not apply in situations where "the abortion is necessary to
prevent either the death of the pregnant woman or the substantial and
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the woman. 29
In the case of both exceptions the abortion must be performed in a
hospital and an attending physician must be present in case of a live
birth of the aborted "child."3° °
The new Pennsylvania law also requires the physician to determine
the gestational age of the "unborn child."3 1  Unlike the Missouri
statute, however, there is no discussion in the Pennsylvania law of a
point at which viability is presumed to exist."°2 In passing the new
law, the Pennsylvania General Assembly also repealed a previous
statute which made post-viability abortions a third-degree felony.
303
Since there is no presumption of viability and no penalty for post-
viability abortions, it is unclear how the state plans to regulate pre-
293. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. §§ 18-3203 to 3220 (Purdon).
294. Id. § 3211(a).
295. Id § 3210. The statute defines "unborn child" as "an individual
organism of the species Homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth." Id.
§ 3203.
296. Id. § 3209.
297. Id § 3205.
298. Id. § 3204.
299. Id § 3211(b)(1).
300. Id. § 3211(c)(3)(5).
301. Id. § 3210.
302. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.029 (1986).
303. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(a) (PurdonSupp. 1989) (repealed).
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viability abortions beyond the gestational determination and spousal
notice requirements.
The spousal notice requirement in the new Pennsylvania law is not
as restrictive as it appears at first glance. This provision requires the
woman undergoing the abortion to sign an unnotorized statement that
"she has notified her spouse that she is about to undergo an abor-
tion."3°  The law claims that "any false statement made [by the
woman] is punishable by law" but the penalties run to the performing
doctor. The statute provides for the possible suspension of the perform-
ing doctor's license and civil liability of the doctor to the unnotified
spouse.305  It also provides for exceptions to the spousal notice
requirement when 1) the woman's spouse is not the father of the "child,"
2) the spouse after diligent effort, could not be found, 3) the pregnancy
results from spousal rape, 4) the woman has reason to believe that she
may receive bodily injury if she informs her spouse and 5) in cases of
medical emergency. W
The Pennsylvania law expands the scope of informed notice
requirements. Before the passage of the new statutes, the law required
the doctor to "orally [inform] the woman of the nature of the proposed
procedure or treatment, and of those risks" involved in the abortion. W
7
The new law requires the performing or referring physician to provide
the following information to the woman at least twenty-four hours prior
to the abortion: 1) the proposed procedure and the risks involved, 2) the
probable gestational age of the "child," and 3) the medical risks involved
with carrying the "child" to term.'
Although the Pennsylvania General Assembly took up the sugges-
tion of the Webster court to legislate upon the abortion question, the
thrust of the new law was far afield from the provisions discussed in
Webster. In passing such a law, the Pennsylvania Legislature may seek
to expand the scope of abortion regulations with a favorable appeal of
the new law to the Supreme Court.
The governor of Missouri and several Missouri legislators are
seeking to place additional restrictions on a woman's access to an
abortion. A new bill proposed in January 1990 in the Missouri House
of Representatives seeks to restrict abortions caused by unwanted
pregnancies, and the use of abortion as a form of birth control, to select
the sex of an offspring, to prevent multiple births, to prevent the loss of
304. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. § 18-3209(a) (hurdon).
305. Id. § 3209(e).
306. Id. § 3209(b).
307. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a) (Purdon 1983) (repealed).
308. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. § 18-3205(a)(1).
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an educational or job opportunity, and to avoid the expense of child
birth or child rearing.'
Governor John Ashcroft of Missouri also plans to propose to the
Missouri General Assembly laws that ban abortions for sex selection,
racial discrimination, and birth control.31 0 According to the governor,
these measures would eliminate the right of a woman to a second
abortion and cut the number of abortions performed in Missouri by
half.3 ' Legislative leaders, however, have indicated they may refuse
to take up abortion related issues until after the 1990 elections.312
The Supreme Court's ruling in Webster invoked only minor change
in existing abortion law. Its greater effect will be determined as state




309. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 17, 1990, at 4A, col. 1.
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